

Commonwealth Defense Arrangements and International Security

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
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
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**A paper by the Institute of USA and Canada
sponsored by the Center for Naval Analyses**

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PREFACE

This paper is the first in a series jointly sponsored by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and Russia's Institute for USA and Canada (ISKAN). The fact that such an association exists at this level between American and Russian institutions demonstrates the degree to which relations between our countries have changed. Cooperation now occurs at all levels of our societies and governments. The purpose of this joint effort is to ensure that this interaction is preserved and increased. Education is the best way to accomplish this goal.

These papers, therefore, are designed not only to inform an interested American community about events in the former USSR, but also to educate Russians about how reform is progressing in their new state. CNA is interested in providing Russia's government and military experts with a forum for expressing their views about the policies of the Russian Federation.

This particular paper, by Sergei Rogov and his staff at ISKAN, provides an extensive overview of the complex relations within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Rogov focuses specifically on military issues and the emergence of republican Armed Forces. The CIS arrangement is clearly not suitable for encouraging political cooperation; Rogov et al. suggest that it cannot even forge a military union. Yet, a new security structure has clearly emerged following the May summit in Tashkent. This paper discusses the implications of the Tashkent agreement as well as predicts a framework for Russia's future security relations.

CNA expects to publish more occasional papers in conjunction with ISKAN. We look forward to a continuing relationship with our Russian counterpart, a relationship that we hope will lead to future joint studies.

Robert J. Murray
President
Center for Naval Analyses

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THE BIRTH OF THE COMMONWEALTH

On December 8, 1991, the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of Belarus Stanislav Shushkevich announced that "the objective process of withdrawal of republics from the USSR and formation of independent states has become a real fact"¹ and declared the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This decision ended the efforts of the President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev to save the USSR through a new Union Treaty, which Ukraine had refused to sign. The Commonwealth seemed to be a looser arrangement that would allow Ukraine to join with Russia, Belarus, and the other Soviet republics. The leaders of the three Slavic republics stated, "Member-States of the Commonwealth intend to follow the policy of strengthening international peace and security."² But the founders of the CIS were rather vague in details concerning the implementation of this pledge.

The Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed on December 8, 1991, included Article 6, which stated:

Member-States of the Commonwealth will preserve and maintain the common strategic-military space under unified command, including the single control over nuclear weapons, which is regulated by a special arrangement. They [the republics] will jointly guarantee the necessary conditions of deployment, functioning, and social support for strategic military forces. The Parties pledge to conduct a coordinated policy on questions concerning social protection and pensions for military personnel and their families.³

This unusual wording ("command over common strategic-military space") raised many questions. Skeptics interpreted it as a reflection of the parties' inability to compromise on more specific details of their possible defense cooperation. Optimists believed that the first declarations would be followed by more detailed arrangements for creating a common defense alliance.

At this point, there were three main options for the future of the former Soviet Union. The first option is a loose confederation. In this case, the bulk of Soviet military power, including all nuclear forces, would remain under central control. This option requires participation by two republics, which are of critical importance—Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Without Ukraine, the confederation would resemble an uneven mix of Russia and the small, mostly Muslim, entities. Kazakhstan would serve as a natural bridge between Russia and Central Asia.

The position taken by the Ukrainian government, which was competing with the nationalistic opposition, makes this option highly unlikely. Ukrainian developments will probably influence changes in Russia. Unless the Ukraine reconsiders its position, Russia could be left with only the Muslim republics, which, while lagging behind Russia in population and especially GNP, will greatly outnumber the largest member of the federation. It would make little sense for Russia to finance the underdeveloped Central Asian economies while accepting their political claims.

The second option is an economic and political alliance of independent states without a central government, but with unified, allied military forces. In this case, Russia might inherit the bulk of the Soviet military power, including all nuclear forces. In such an alliance, Russia would play a role equal to or greater than the United States plays within NATO. This variant would be possible if accepted by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which have not been enthusiastic about the withdrawal of nuclear weapons to Russia.

Obviously, Ukrainian and Kazakh leaders reconsidered their previous commitments due to the substantial Russian population in those republics and the territorial claims made by some leaders of the Russian government. They don't seem to be willing to make those republics nuclear-free zones, despite the fact that the disastrous ecological consequences of Chernobyl and the Semipalatinsk testing ground have made the population very suspicious of nuclear power.

The third option could mean a chaotic disintegration of the Soviet Union. Such an evolution could be peaceful, but might become violent. The dramatic events in Yugoslavia, where the multiethnic society couldn't arrange a "civilized divorce," seems quite possible in the former USSR.

The newly born states, except Russia and possibly Ukraine, will be economically inviable and politically very unstable. The post-totalitarian leadership will tend to be authoritarian and will accept little serious political dissent. These leaders also may become passionately nationalistic (nationalism is the only ideology today that can replace communism in the former Soviet republics) and more extremist in their treatment of ethnic minorities. It's probable that they may also be engaged in violent territorial conflicts with their neighbors—the other former Soviet republics.

If the disintegration of the Soviet Union leads to the disintegration of the Russian federation, it is also feasible that the process of fragmentation will create more than 15 new states. The drive of the Tartar and the Chechen autonomous republics for complete independence seems to indicate the possible fragmentation of Russia itself.

Even more threatening, however, is the prospect of a backlash of great Russian nationalism, which would be triggered by growing discrimination against Russian minorities in the other former Soviet republics. The Russian inhabitants, reaching from 10 to 40 percent of the population in those republics, will quickly turn from a privileged component of the dominant nation (the Soviet Union) to an ostracized group of second-class citizens and even third-class noncitizens.

The defense arrangements for the Commonwealth are of crucial importance to the fate of all former Soviet republics. At a meeting with top military leaders at the Defense Ministry of the USSR on December 10, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev, still formally the President of the Soviet Union and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, failed to win their support to preserve the Union.⁴

The next day Russian President Yeltsin was more successful in explaining to the same audience the reasons for forming the Commonwealth. He announced that the creation of the CIS would lead to a defense treaty and a collective security based on unity of command of the Armed Forces and centralized control over the nation's nuclear and strategic potential. According to Yeltsin, these arrangements did not preclude the transfer

of some defense authority to leaders of sovereign states, their defense ministries, and armed formations.

Yeltsin said that Russia did not plan to create its own Army, or Defense Ministry, "unless it is forced to do so."⁵ If this were to happen, Russia would transfer its ground forces to the Unified Command, which should remain under any condition. He also promised to improve the social conditions of the military, to raise officers' salaries by 90 percent, and to build more housing for them. This approach received a more positive response.⁶

The military, therefore, remained politically passive during the fateful events of December 1991, which ended the existence of the superpower named the Soviet Union. "The Army was presented, at the end of last year, with a fait accompli. If officers would have known it before, events could have been different,"⁷ said Captain 1st Rank Alexander Mochaikin, who became the Chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Officers' Assemblies.

Problems appeared almost immediately, however. At several meetings in mid-December with representatives of the republics, Defense Minister of the USSR, Aviation Marshal Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, put forward his plan for military reform in the Soviet Union.

Army General Konstantin Kobets, the State Adviser for the Russian Government on Defense Matters; Professor Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet of Russia; and a group of civilian experts suggested a different approach, which envisaged an early conclusion of the Common Defense Treaty of the CIS and formation of an Allied Defense Organization. They failed, however, to get Russia's official support for these proposals.

Thus, the USSR Defense Ministry of the Soviet Union had a free hand to negotiate measures with the other republics, to keep the centralized military forces intact, and to give the republics only limited authority over civil defense and military district conscription offices. This approach excluded the formation of any republican military forces. Ukraine totally rejected the idea of a "single"⁸ military organization for the Commonwealth. President Leonid Kravchuk announced that the original Commonwealth agreements "don't provide formation of any united structures of military command, except the collective command of strategic forces."⁹ During the ratification of the CIS agreements, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a number of amendments, one of which declared: "Member-States of the Commonwealth are reforming the troops of the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union deployed on their territory, creating their own Armed Forces on these bases."¹⁰

At the end of December, at the Alma-Ata summit, the three original founders of the Commonwealth were joined by Kazakhstan, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and four Central Asian republics.

For the Alma-Ata summit, the Ministry of Defense proposals included a draft Treaty on a Defense Union, with a commitment for mutual defense in case of external aggression. The draft also proposed the creation of a United Armed Forces to be headed by the Main

Command. It also envisaged joint financing of the Unified Armed Forces, with each state assigned a quota. The United Command was practically divorced from any civilian political control, and republics had few opportunities to influence the decisions of the military leaders.

The Defense Ministry proposals were rejected in Alma-Ata due to resistance by Ukraine, which wanted to form its own Armed Forces. Ukraine was soon followed by Azerbaijan and Moldova, and then by Belarus and Uzbekistan.

Nevertheless, the Alma-Ata summit made two important decisions in the military field. First, the presidents of 11 republics appointed Marshal Shaposhnikov the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for the interim period of two months. More important was the agreement made by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus on nuclear weapons. The agreement (1) recognized the long-expressed desires of Ukraine and Belarus to become nonnuclear states (with Ukraine promising to get rid of strategic nuclear weapons by the end of 1994), (2) provided for withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons to central storage facilities (in Russia) by July 1, 1992, and (3) established an elaborate procedure for decision-making on nuclear matters by the four presidents. Actual control over the button, however, was given only to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Marshal Shaposhnikov.

At the second Minsk summit on December 30, 1991, the presidents signed the Agreement on Strategic Forces. This Agreement provided for the creation of the Commonwealth Strategic Forces, which included four out of five services of the former Soviet Armed Forces—the Strategic Missile Force, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Air Defense—as well as the Space Forces, Military Transportation Aviation, Air Born troops, and other elements. This Agreement indicated that the leaders of the Soviet military recognized that Ukraine and some other republics would soon "nationalize" the Army units on their territories. Therefore, the former USSR Defense Ministry decided to allow the republics to obtain control of the Ground Forces, while keeping everything else under its "Strategic Forces" umbrella.

On December 31, 1991, former USSR Defense Minister Marshal Shaposhnikov decreed that he would become Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces. By broadly interpreting the Alma Ata decision to appoint him temporary Commander of the Armed Forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov appointed the Deputy Defense Ministers to become Deputies to the Commander-in-Chief and subordinated the Defense Ministry to the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. No such decision was made by the heads of states.¹¹

Ukraine rejected this move and, in the beginning of January 1992, announced that all forces on its territory should come under its control. Ukraine's decision excluded Strategic Missile Forces, but included the Black Sea Navy. In addition, it provoked an angry reaction from not only the Main Command of the Unified Armed Forces, but also Russian President Yeltsin, who alleged that the Black Sea Fleet had been and would always be Russian. This conflict, which soon became public, was interpreted in Ukraine and some other republics as a conspiratorial effort by Russia to establish military domination by using the Main Command of the Unified Forces as a tool of Russian "imperial aspirations."

The Ukrainian government openly criticized the Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth forces, Aviation Marshal Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, alleging that he had interfered in Ukrainian-Russian disputes. "The status of Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of several independent states demands that he should refrain from any actions that may question his impartiality in performance of his functions,"¹² said the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry in a protest note sent to Air Force Marshal Shaposhnikov, after Shaposhnikov criticized Ukrainian claims on the Black Sea Fleet.

The Ukraine Defense Ministry newspaper claimed that "Ukraine has the right to nationalize everything on its territory, just as Russia did."¹³ It alleged:

According to all international laws, if a state collapses, its property, including the Navy, is divided relative to the share of each republic, which means that Ukraine should have 18 percent of all property. So the entire Navy must be divided among all former republics of the USSR. It is officially known that the CIS Navy consists of 1,400 ships and boats, 1,638 airplanes, and 551 helicopters, and justice demands that we distribute all those forces among 15 former Soviet republics, in accordance with international law. Even those republics who have no access to the sea can sell their ships abroad, for scrap, to get money for their budgets. Ukraine can claim more ships than there are now in the Black Sea Fleet.... And the Navy should be divided in proportion not to numbers, but to types and tonnage of ships. So if the Navy belongs to the entire CIS, it has to be divided accordingly among all members of the CIS, the Baltic states, and Georgia.¹⁴

But the Main Command of the Unified Forces and the Soviet Navy ignored Ukrainian demands. Refusing to recognize the Ukraine's clear desire to conduct a totally independent military policy, some Soviet military leaders wanted to keep not only the Black Sea Navy, but new ships currently under construction in Ukrainian shipyards. The Commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral V. Chernavin, said that "new ships that are built for other fleets, after their construction is finished, will be transferred to their crews and removed to their bases" outside of Ukraine.¹⁵

Another area of conflict between the republics and the Main Command (with Russia in the background) has developed in the Trans-Caucasian military district. The revolt of the National Guard against Georgian President Zviad Gamsahurdia prevented the escalation of conflict between Georgian forces and Soviet troops deployed there. But the military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh deeply involved the 4th and 7th Armies of the Trans-Caucasian military district. Armenians and Azerbaijanis, lacking enough trained military manpower, are trying to take control of both the weapons and the Army units. The Armenian President, however, went on the record to take a very strong pro-CIS position. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has failed to ratify the Commonwealth agreements.

Air Force Marshal Shaposhnikov strongly criticized Azerbaijan and warned:

It's not difficult to imagine what will happen if the leadership of Azerbaijan realizes its plan to build its own Armed Forces on the basis of the 4th Army of the Trans-Caucasian military district and, in response, Armenia forms its own Armed Forces on the basis of the 7th Army. The involvement of regular troops in combat operations opens dark prospects. It will turn the conflict, which can and must be solved by peaceful means, into a large-scale war.... Clearly this cannot be allowed. I'm absolutely sure that the Caucasian states must refrain from forming their own Armed Forces until a political solution and complete settlement of the Karabakh conflict.¹⁶

This announcement was perceived by Azerbaijan and Armenia as an effort to block the creation of their own armies, which they wanted to use against each other.

After Marshal Shaposhnikov blamed then-President of Armenia Ayaz Mutalibov for using the Grad MLRS against civilian inhabitants of the Armenian town Stepanakert, Azerbaijan Presidential spokesman, Rasim Agayev, said: "This is a revenge on Azerbaijan for its policy of independence." Hinting at the use of force to replace the President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsahurdia, Agayev alleged: "This is a dirty militarist game to provoke anti-Army feelings in Azerbaijan and channel events into the Georgian scenario."¹⁷

Analyzing the Army response to events in the Trans-Caucasian region and Moldova, the newspaper *Izvestiya* concluded: "The Army quite soon will get involved in the political process. The consequences of such developments hardly need to be explained. When the military understandably wants to prevent bloodshed, but to do it on its own, this becomes totally counterproductive. The Army that defends itself, but not the country, is no longer an Army."¹⁸ According to *Izvestiya*, "New independent states want to know clearly their rights in dealing with the Army. They reject the role of a state within a state which the Armed Forces of the CIS now play on the territories of politically independent republics."¹⁹

The possible independent role of the military is of growing concern. A report from the Center RF-Politika, the informational and analytical center of the Russian Federation, known for its liberal views, noted: "There is talk among the military about the possibility and necessity of a change of government, because 'the President is sick.' Officers in some units near Moscow received instructions on 'temporary responsibilities' for the civilian government 'in case of an emergency.'"²⁰

According to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, "the military is concentrating a terrible power and can force us to go where we all don't want to go."²¹ "Both in Georgia and Azerbaijan, an armed conflict was the reason for dismissal of presidents—there is a direct relationship between these events. And if something like this happens in any other region, this can lead to an overthrow of any president."²² Even the former Soviet Defense Ministry's newspaper *Red Star* demanded "special measures to prevent the military from

turning into a self-organizing force ready to start an independent struggle to defend its interests."²³

Polls in Russia demonstrate that only 12 percent agree that the military should become an independent political force, whereas 63 percent think the Army should not interfere in politics. Nevertheless, even in Moscow, which is considered the bulwark of liberals, only 45 percent believe the Armed Forces must remain loyal to the government under any circumstances, 23 percent consider that, in some cases, the Army may disobey the government, and 32 percent have no opinion.²⁴ But in Russia, the prestige of the Armed Forces is relatively high. Most Moscovites (68 percent) believe the Army should remain united and only 15 percent think each Commonwealth state has the right to its own military forces.²⁵

By the end of the winter of 1992, it became clear that military issues are the key point of discontent for members of the Commonwealth and are bringing it to the breaking point. The CIS summits have failed to solve the conflict over defense issues among the Commonwealth members.

The package signed at the Minsk summit on February 14 included a number of documents dealing with military issues. The most important of them was "The Agreement on Status of Strategic Forces."²⁶ Article 1 of the Agreement redefined the composition of the Strategic Forces, practically eliminating the broad definition created at Alma-Ata. According to this article, the units included in the Strategic Forces "are determined by each state and are agreed upon by the Command of the Strategic Forces and approved by the Council of Heads of State." This was a major victory for Ukraine, allowing it to extend its claims not only to the Black Sea Fleet, but also to the Air Force and Air Defense units on its territory.

According to Article 2, the Strategic Forces are created to ensure the security of all participants to the Agreement and are to be jointly financed by them. An effort to make the Strategic Forces "the common property of all states" was successfully resisted by Russian representatives with unusual support from Ukraine. Apparently, "the big two" didn't want all 11 participating republics to make legal claims for a share of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. If this had not been done, the world's nuclear club would have tripled its membership.

The parties promised not to redeploy unilaterally Strategic Forces units and installations and not to disrupt their normal activities "unless they contradict the legislation of a sovereign state." The last condition could cause serious political disputes in the future. The participants also gave the Strategic Forces the right to possess its property and allowed it to move property outside of the territory of state. This provision legalizes the transfers of nuclear systems to Russian territory. Finally, the parties failed to reach an agreement on how to man and finance the Strategic Forces, deciding to postpone these issues.

Article 4 made the Commander of Strategic Forces subordinate to the Council of Heads of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. Decisions to use nuclear weapons are defined by Article 4 of the Minsk Agreement of December 30, 1991. Article 6 provides the Strategic Forces with substantial freedom of operation on the territory of independent states. Article 9 permits withdrawal from the Agreement after one year of notice.

The document was not well prepared, which resulted in a legal anomaly: Paragraph 2 of Article 11 puts the Agreement in force 10 days after ratification by all sides, whereas paragraph 3 puts it in force immediately after it is signed. Because no state has even started the ratification procedure, this discrepancy may result in substantial disputes concerning the validity of the agreement.

It should be noted that Ukraine has put a condition on its participation in the Agreement: by the end of 1994, when Ukraine is supposed to have given up all nuclear weapons, it will withdraw from the Agreement. Azerbaijan conditioned its participation on the financing of the Strategic Forces. It will only support forces deployed on its territory until they are completely withdrawn by the end of 1994.

Another important agreement signed in Minsk created the United General Purpose Forces. Only eight states signed this agreement, however. Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan refused to participate. Belarus, while agreeing to sign the agreement, was quite hesitant, which later created some confusion.

Even with Belarusian participation, the agreement calls for the formation of a special structure within the evolving Commonwealth defense organization, and it also complicates the formation of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. So while Air Marshal Evgeniy Shaposhnikov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces (at the initiative of Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan) at the summit, there was no agreement to create the CIS Unified Armed Forces.

The participants also signed an agreement on social and legal guarantees to military personnel, demobilized soldiers, and members of their families. The agreement promised the military political, social, economic, and personal rights, which many former Soviet republics already had limited because most of their officers and soldiers had foreign citizenship. Abiding by Article 4 of the Agreement, the parties attempted to coordinate their legislation on those issues in 1992.

Two more agreements—one on financing of the Armed Forces and one on maintenance, procurement, and R&D—signed in Minsk were declaratory in nature and did not impose any obligations on the participants. Nevertheless, the agreement on financing was not signed by Ukraine and Azerbaijan, who declared that they will provide only their share of financing for the Strategic Forces on their territory.²⁷ Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan removed their signatures from the second agreement, which makes the validity of those agreements questionable as well.

For the summit in Kiev, the Main Command of the CIS United Armed Forces (the former Defense Ministry of the USSR) prepared a package of more than two dozen new agreements. One of the drafts provided for a procedure that would enable the members of the Commonwealth to ratify the START and CFE treaties. Another agreement considered the protection of borders, which should be the responsibility of the Commonwealth border troops and the border troops of member-states.

The Main Command wanted to establish "a legal foundation" for the operations of the CIS United Armed Forces stating that, until the complete reorganization of Armed Forces of the former USSR, military activities would be guided by agreements among the Commonwealth states, decisions by CIS bodies, and legal acts of individual states as well

as legal acts of the former Soviet Union, as long as the Soviet laws don't contradict the decisions mentioned above.

The Main Command suggested that the CIS Council of Heads of State become the highest Commonwealth body on defense matters. The Council should adopt the military doctrine and the nuclear strategy of the Commonwealth, establish a procedure for decision-making on employment of nuclear weapons, and create measures to exclude their unauthorized use. In addition, it was suggested that the Council of Defense Ministers coordinate military policy.

The documents provided by the Main Command stated that, in order to maintain existing forces deployed on the territory of independent states through the transition period, the republics must promise to maintain a single system of military draft service for the CIS United Armed Forces. The suggested draft age is from 18 to 27 years, with 18 months of service for most soldiers and 24 months for sailors. Those draftees with a higher education should also serve for 24 months. Volunteers can sign contracts to serve for a longer period of time.

The Main Command also wanted to maintain the existing system for (1) pre-military training in secondary schools and (2) special centers for future draftees. The group suggested that manpower quotas for personnel from each state be established and that each state agree not to prevent its citizens from serving in the CIS Unified Armed Forces.

Strategic Forces are supposed to draw draftees from different states. It is proposed that General Purpose Forces (seven states agreed to establish such forces) on the territory of each state be manned by draftees from that territory and by volunteers from different states.

According to Colonel Vasiliy Volkov, chief of the department on defense legislation of the Commonwealth Office of United Forces, "adoption of all these documents will allow us to maintain a single strategic space on the territory of the CIS, ensure a system of military control, and help protect the rights and interests of the servicemen and their family members."²⁸

Nevertheless, it is highly questionable that this package, which differs little from previous MOD versions, could solve the problems that prevented the leaders of the Commonwealth from reaching agreements at earlier summits. The approach of the Main Command still denies independent states any serious control of the Soviet Armed Forces. The military remains disconnected from the state (or states) and continues to want to operate without normal subordination to civilian authorities.

The Main Command position does not allow the former Soviet republics any control over the deployment of forces on their territories or over the composition of those forces. Most of the Commonwealth states find this unacceptable and are afraid to allow military forces that are not controlled by them on their territories. Under such conditions, the republics would be unable to control the military expenditures or the procurement policy of the Main Command.

"Unless this meeting reaches a turning point, the Commonwealth can be seen as just a face-saving device," announced the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, on the eve of

CIS summit in Kiev on March 20, 1992.²⁹ "I'm sure that the CIS is not going to continue for long,"³⁰ seconded the Prime-Minister of Ukraine, Vitold Fokin.

The Kiev summit on March 20, 1992, produced another package of documents related to Commonwealth defense arrangements. Their importance, however, is not yet clear. The Agreement on CIS Higher Bodies for Defense Questions gives the main authority to the Council of Heads of State (Article 1). The Council is authorized to: (1) develop and implement the military policy of the Commonwealth, (2) adopt the military doctrine and the nuclear strategy of the Commonwealth, (3) establish a procedure for use of nuclear weapons, (4) settle the composition and the structure of the Unified Armed Forces, (5) organize the Main Command, and (6) appoint the Commander-in-Chief, his deputies, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Commander of Strategic Forces (Article 2).

Such provisions open the way for the CIS to evolve toward a NATO-type military alliance. The Agreement, however, was only signed by seven presidents. Turkmenistan did not participate in the Kiev summit, and Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan refused to sign the agreement. Belarus agreed to participate, but only for a two-year transition period.

Some of the provisions of the Agreement raise the question of excessive authority for the presidents, which violates the constitutions of their own states. For instance, Article 2 gives the Council of Heads of States the power to: (1) determine allocations for defense and maintenance of the Unified Armed Forces, (2) establish conditions of war on the entire territory of the Commonwealth, declare war, and (3) conclude peace. Such powers encroach on the constitutional authority of the Parliaments, especially their budgetary responsibilities and the power to make war and peace.

The Agreement also features Article 3, which describes the responsibilities of the Council of Heads of Governments. This institution, together with the Main Command, is given the power to develop weapons programs, determine the procedure for the implementation of military orders, decide on the levels of conscription, and so forth.

Article 4 mentions the Council of Defense Ministers, but does not describe its functions. There is no provision in the Agreement for withdrawal from the Unified Armed Forces. Not surprisingly, this Agreement doesn't even mention the ratification process and claims, in Article 5, that it "comes into force the moment it is signed for the states that signed it."

This agreement, which was drafted by the former Soviet Defense Ministry, reflects the deep desire of the military establishment to retain the kind of governmental environment it is used to operating under. The Council of Heads of States is entrusted with functions similar to those of the Politburo of the Communist Party. It also demonstrates a traditional disregard for elected, representative bodies of government. The Council of Heads of Governments is given the same responsibilities as the former Council of Ministers of the USSR.

This approach was meant for a centralized (single) state, which the Soviet Union used to be, and needs at least a federation to be implemented. Yet, the Commonwealth is not even a confederation. Thus, the military's ability to reach some agreements, when it had failed at previous CIS summits, can only be considered a Pyrrhic victory. Ultimately, these agreements can only facilitate the Commonwealth's disintegration.

The Agreement on CIS Higher Bodies for Defense Questions can hardly be seen as a Commonwealth agreement; only participants in the Unified General Purpose Forces consider it to be such. Actually, it creates "a Commonwealth within a Commonwealth," that is, a kind of inner military alliance with a much looser amalgamation. But this division among members of the CIS can only aggravate any contradictions among them. With Belarus leaving in two years (if not sooner) and Armenia possibly doing the same, Russia remains in this alliance with only the Muslim republics. This may be insufficient to keep Russia interested in it.

And finally, the questionable legality of the Agreement on CIS Higher Bodies for Defense Questions makes it possible for Parliaments to invalidate it or withdraw without any warning. To a great extent, this is true in respect to another agreement signed in Kiev, which provides an umbrella for the Commonwealth defense arrangements. Article 2 of the Agreement on CIS Unified Armed Forces stipulates that the Unified Armed Forces consist of Strategic Forces (which involve Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus) and General Purpose Forces (which involve eight states, not including Ukraine). Article 4 of the Agreement mentions the possibility of transferring units of the national armies of the former Soviet republics to the operational control of the Main Command of the Unified Armed Forces. This would imply that Ukraine, which is not participating in the Unified Armed Forces, is supposed to remain a participant in the Strategic Forces, which will be an integral part of Unified Armed Forces. It is not clear how this contradiction is going to be solved.

As far as the General Purpose Forces are concerned, the Agreement includes only former Soviet troops, which have not been divided by the republics and remain (like Strategic Forces) a supranational military organization belonging to no state. The General Purpose Forces now include forces in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, and Armenia. Those republics that form their own armies may participate in the Unified Armed Forces by placing their units under direct control of the Main Command, by-passing commands of either Strategic or General Purpose Forces.

At the Kiev summit, the participants agreed to establish a group of observers to monitor Commonwealth peacekeeping forces in areas involving national conflicts; this group could be deployed at the request of one side in a dispute as long as the other countries involved consented to the request. It is too early to say whether this idea is practical. It should be noted, however, that the observers and peacekeeping forces are not organically included in the CIS Unified Forces.

It is clear that such an arrangement cannot work. The Unified Armed Forces cannot guarantee the security and integrity of member-states of the Commonwealth. A Ukrainian newspaper commented: "The Unified Armed Forces of the CIS, the purpose of which is to ensure the strategic security of all participating states, is strictly neutral in the Karabakh conflict and is even trading weapons, because for the opposing sides there is no other source of tanks, artillery guns, MLRSs, and ammunition for them."³¹ Is it realistic to expect that such a complicated organizational structure can operate effectively?

The existence of supranational forces can be seen only as a short-term phenomena. It appears that even the leaders of the former Soviet Defense Ministry have begun to recognize this. After the Kiev summit, Marshal Shaposhnikov gave an interview in which he stated: "Analyzing the events, I changed my view about the concept of United [single]

Armed Forces. One has to be realistic and see that there is no way back and this concept is totally outdated."³² He also said that the CIS "might in the future evolve into a defense alliance."³³

It can be predicted that Ukraine as well as a number of other republics will refuse, not only politically but also financially, to support the proposals of the Main Command. Unless the former Soviet republics produce a meaningful compromise on defense matters, the entire military arrangement of the Commonwealth could turn out to be an empty shell that will soon collapse.

The Kiev summit caused Boris Yeltsin to change his mind about the creation of the Armed Forces of Russia. Sergey Shahray, then a vice-premier of Russia, later admitted: "After the August events, the Army, for quite some time, was left on its own and played the role of an independent political force. There was an unnecessary delay in redefining the status of the Armed Forces and creating the Defense Ministry of Russia."³⁴ According to Shahray, Russia must base its relations with the other republics on the principles of collective security and defense: "It is necessary to reach agreements on collective defense with those states, which don't intend to create their own armies, and agreements on collective security with those states, which have or will have their own armies."³⁵

The Russian leadership belatedly realized that it had made a major mistake when it refused to determine its own approach to defense issues. This allowed the Defense Ministry of the former USSR to define the shape of the CIS Unified Forces. This posture fueled the fears of other members of the Commonwealth, who were afraid that Russia would use the Defense Ministry as a cover for its imperial ambitions. This fear is why the CIS summits in Brest, Alma-Ata, Minsk, and Kiev failed to create a defense alliance that would have transformed the Soviet Army into the Allied Military Forces of the Commonwealth (with some of the military transferred to the national armies of the independent states). Compromise formulas such as "the common military and strategic space," which avoid the issue of common defense structures, are a poor substitute for this failure.

The CIS Unified Military Forces cannot exist in a political vacuum. These forces need a legal base (a common defense pact) and a political structure (similar to the political decision-making bodies of NATO). This structure is possible only if Russia successfully eliminates the fears of its potential allies by agreeing to complete equality among all CIS members, including the equivalent participation in the higher coordination political and military bodies of the Commonwealth, which should be in complete control of the Allied Military Forces.

Each sovereign state has a right to create its own military forces and nobody can blame the independent Ukraine for doing so. But efforts to achieve immediate military independence do not take into account the security interests of Russia. It seems that Ukraine is suspicious of Russia, expecting it to make territorial claims on the Crimea and some other territories. Ukraine is preparing to resist such an eventuality.

Unilateral efforts to "nationalize" the military, however, produce resistance mostly from Russian officers and can result in total chaos and confrontation among army components, the military, and political institutions.

It was, therefore, impossible not to differentiate between the Commonwealth and Russian defense structures. Russia had to create its own Defense Ministry and other military structures to ensure political control of the military. It was finally understood that Russia had to establish the Allied structures. However, it still needed to form its own Armed Forces so that it could, along with other republics, join the Allied system. It could not allow the former Soviet Defense Ministry to speak for Russia.

The new approach was obvious at the CIS summit held in Tashkent on May 15, 1992. On the eve of the Tashkent summit, President Yeltsin announced: "We shall insist that the proposed Treaty concerning political security issues be signed.... This Treaty can shape the framework of the Commonwealth. It could help to define the status and the functions of the CIS Strategic Forces. This framework can be compared to a military and political block."³⁶

At the Tashkent summit, the draft of the Treaty on Collective Security was jointly proposed by Yeltsin and Nazarbayev. This document was originally prepared by those two republics. The Treaty was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia.

The Treaty outlined the republics' obligations "to consult with each other on all important matters of international security" and "to coordinate their positions and take measures to eliminate threats" (Article 2). In case of "an aggression against any member-state, all other member-states will provide the necessary assistance, including military assistance" (Article 4). Article 3 establishes the Collective Security Council consisting of Heads of Member-States and the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. According to Article 5, "the Collective Security Council of Member-States and other bodies created by it are responsible for coordination and organization of joint activities." Meanwhile, the Main Command of the Commonwealth Unified Armed Forces will coordinate the activities of the Armed Forces of the member-states. The Heads of Member-States will make any decisions on using the Armed Forces to repulse aggression (Article 6).

The Collective Security Treaty is a five-year treaty that can be prolonged. It must be ratified by the member-states, although a state can later withdraw from the Treaty six months after notification (Article 11).

This treaty appears to be a mutual assistance agreement and can be viewed as a formal defense alliance. National Armed Forces will be included in this alliance.³⁷ The State Secretary of Russia, Gennadiy Burbulis, has said that the states which signed the Collective Security Treaty may form a confederation. In his view, the confederation may include Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, and Armenia.³⁸

It appears that the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was formed in December 1991 as an amalgamation of three Slavic republics and which excluded the Caucasian and Central Asian republics, is taking shape six months later as an arrangement between Russia and the Muslim republic (without Azerbaijan, but with Armenia). All of the other European republics, with the possible exception of Belarus, are distancing themselves from the CIS. Today's arrangement is very different from Russia's original image of the Commonwealth. This situation reflects a certain lack of strategy on the part of

Russia, which is the only republic that can serve as the core of a coalition of former Soviet republics. Russia neglected to provide the necessary initiatives that could revitalize the CIS by limiting its involvement in the developments in other republics. Failing to compromise with Ukraine, Russia faces the prospects of sluggish relations with the other more developed republics, while accepting closer links with the culturally and religiously different, underdeveloped Central Asian republics. These republics are also prone to social unrest and ethnic conflicts.

The post-Communist bureaucratic regimes in Central Asia, while trying to gain the support of Turkey and Iran, are still feeling insecure after the collapse of the Nadgibulla regime in Afghanistan. The revolt of democratic and fundamentalist forces in Tadzhikistan in April and May forced the Central Asian republics to turn to Russia for support and protection. Russia's response was probably connected to its concern about the substantial Russian population in the Central Asian republics. These Russians may find themselves in a hostage situation when religious and ethnic riots occur.

At the outcome of the Tashkent summit, observers concluded that: "The waves of Afghanistan rushed unchecked through post-Communist Tadzhikistan and brought the forces of opposition to the top. The gap in the Asian 'wall' is of serious concern to the leaders of neighboring republics with slightly camouflaged Communist regimes. They rely on Russia to be the guarantor of their security."³⁹ Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov said: "We are on the eve of tremendous chaos."⁴⁰ Karimov sees Russia as "a guarantor of stability."⁴¹

According to the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, "the Slavic union turned out to be frail."⁴² Analyzing the results of the Tashkent summit, another newspaper, *Nezavisimaya Gazetta*, concluded: "At this meeting, Russia finally faced Asia. This has been predicted: after all, 'the Asian perspective' of the Soviet Union without Ukraine produced a decision by the three European republics to create the CIS instead of the collapsing USSR. After several months, it became clear that the loyalty of the Central Asian governments is more beneficial than the geographical position of Ukraine."⁴³ *Izvestiya* commented that:

The Tashkent summit allows hope that the CIS might survive for quite some time, because it provides an acceptable instrument to settle common problems and disputes. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth is inevitably changing. First, its collective role will diminish if common interests are weakened. Second, a nucleus of closely cooperating states may be formed through participation in the Collective Security Treaty, while some republics will keep their distance and may obtain the status of observers.⁴⁴

Apparently, the process of creating nation-states will continue. Cooperation among the newly independent nations can survive only if Russia recognizes that its national security interests are not identical to the interests of the other republics. This is why the Commonwealth arrangement will likely give ground to several multilateral and bilateral security arrangements between Russia and the other republics. In most cases, members of the CIS can and should become natural partners and allies of the Russian Federation. These nations are tied together by a common military machine, which is still practically

intact. It is obvious that, with the creation of a Russian Armed Forces, the supranational military formations won't survive for long. According to President Kravchuk, "After Russia created its own Armed Forces, the Unified Armed Forces became just a symbol, not a reality."⁴⁵

The Unified Armed Forces, which is still "a single army," unavoidably will be divided by the former Soviet republics. In this way, they will become truly unified, allied forces, resembling the national components of NATO that are subordinated to a Unified Command. In addition to creating a broader defense coalition, Russia should also build bilateral relations with its potential partners. This may be especially necessary with the Baltic states and Ukraine. In some cases, multinational units may remain, but they will probably be formed as a result of bilateral agreements between Russia and the Central Asian republics.

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THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION

In the Statement by leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, signed on December 8, 1991, the founders of the CIS stated that "they guarantee implementation of international commitments related to treaties and commitments of the former USSR, and ensure single control over nuclear weapons and their non-proliferation."⁴⁶ In the Agreement on Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the parties agreed "to respect each other's desire to achieve nonnuclear status."⁴⁷ This statement implied the eventual denuclearization of Ukraine and Belarus, republics that, after the Chernobyl disaster, constitutionally pledged to become nuclear free.

When Kazakhstan joined the CIS, however, it refused to make a commitment on denuclearization. And later, serious doubts emerged about Ukrainian intentions. The problem of the Soviet nuclear legacy turned out to be the most difficult problem within the Commonwealth.

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus were completely excluded from any decision-making on nuclear questions in the Soviet Union. After its collapse, those republics had no policy and no information on this matter. In addition, public opinion in all three republics was strongly antinuclear (even against peaceful use of nuclear energy). Immediately after the August "putsh" and proclamation of their independence, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus rejected Russian suggestions, made in a rather heavy-handed way, to withdraw all nuclear weapons to the territory of Russia.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the three republics began to see themselves as de facto nuclear states, demanding that Russia agree to a procedure of collective decision-making on nuclear matters, which was reflected in the Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements in late December 1991. The founding agreements of the CIS avoided the question of ownership of Soviet nuclear weapons, stressing the continuation of a single (centralized) control over nuclear weapons. The Strategic Forces of the Commonwealth were created as a nonnational and even supernational structure. But the question of ownership had to appear sooner or later.

The arrangements concerning technical control over nuclear systems (which is in the hands of President Boris Yeltsin and Marshal Shaposhnikov) do not appear satisfactory to other republics. "The first priority problem of the Commonwealth," according to Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev, "is the problem of nuclear weapons. The existing system of control over the nuclear button, which is in Russian hands, is insufficient. It's necessary to have a system where a launch is blocked by presidents of all states where nuclear weapons are deployed."⁴⁸

Commenting on the proposals made by Russian President Boris Yeltsin at the summit with President George Bush in January 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said: "It's possible to reduce only something you own. If he [Yeltsin] spoke about the Strategic Forces of the entire Commonwealth, we had not authorized him to do it on our behalf."⁴⁹

After Russian President Yeltsin introduced new proposals for strategic arms reductions, the Kazakhstan government said that "those progressive ideas need to be

discussed by all members of the CIS and especially with those who possess nuclear potential."⁵⁰

In the beginning of 1992, Ukraine started making claims on the Black Sea Fleet and some other components of the Strategic Forces. The Ukrainian government also announced that only Ukrainian citizens would serve in the Strategic Forces on its territory. Ukrainian representatives also claimed that Ukraine would give up nuclear warheads, but would keep the delivery vehicles—tactical and strategic missiles and aircraft.

Ukraine also leads Belarus and Kazakhstan in pressing Russia to agree to the ratification by all four republics of the START Treaty with the United States. This demand was seen by many experts as preparation to get not only de facto but also de jure nuclear status. At the Kiev summit, Ukraine blocked an agreement on ratification, refusing to recognize Russia as "the only nuclear state." This diplomatic pressure delayed ratification of START by the United States and raised serious concern about the viability of the Treaty.

Ukraine claimed that it would implement those provisions of the START treaty that apply to weapons located on its territory. Moreover, when meeting members of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in January 1992, President Leonid Kravchuk pledged that, although under START 130 strategic missiles located in Ukraine would be eliminated over seven years, all 176 such missiles deployed in Ukraine would be eliminated during a three-year period.⁵¹

Ukraine also declared its readiness to participate in negotiations on nuclear disarmament on a bilateral or multilateral basis with all interested parties, as well as through existing international mechanisms in the field of disarmament.⁵² In addition, Ukraine proposed negotiations among the four CIS nuclear states and the leaders of other nuclear states.⁵³ Ukraine announced its intentions to adhere to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nonnuclear state and to conclude an agreement on guarantees with the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA).⁵⁴ It has failed, however, to take steps to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

On March 12, 1992, President Leonid Kravchuk, speaking at a press conference on the anniversary of the first 100 days of his presidency, announced that Ukraine will stop all transfers of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia:

In the conditions of instability and confusion, Ukraine cannot be sure that the nuclear weapons withdrawn from its territory will be completely eliminated, and won't get into irresponsible hands. Ukraine remains committed to its concept of a nonnuclear neutral state, but it is changing tactical approaches to nuclear weapons, which are in the possession of the former Soviet Armed Forces. The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory is stopped. This is done because Russia doesn't have sufficient facilities to dismantle and destroy large numbers of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.⁵⁵

The Ukrainian President also stated:

Without giving up the strategic goal—to become a nonnuclear and later a neutral state—Ukraine believes that removal of nuclear weapons from its territory and their destruction should be conducted under international control. We asked countries of Western Europe and the United States for such help.⁵⁶

The President's adviser, Anton Bureyko, presented this decision as "a goodwill gesture" because the Alma-Ata agreement, which obliged Ukraine to remove all tactical nuclear weapons by July 1, 1992, had not been ratified. Colonel General Kostantin Morozov, the Ukrainian Defense Minister, also announced that additional measures were being taken to protect the bases where nuclear warheads were kept.⁵⁷

The Ukrainian President suggested building a special industrial zone near Chernobyl where nuclear warheads and missiles could be destroyed. He claimed that such an international center would help defense industry conversion and prevent the "brain drain" of nuclear specialists.⁵⁸

Ukrainian newspapers noted that "just a few days before the summit, Kravchuk publicly expressed lack of confidence in the Russian leadership on the question of the elimination of nuclear weapons, withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine."⁵⁹ Russian observers speculated: "If Yeltsin reacts to Kravchuk's challenge, the CIS probably will break up and the two republics will be on the brink of a conflict (hopefully not a military one). Ukraine will try to become the owner not only of tactical, but also of strategic nuclear weapons, and will raise again the question of the Black Sea Fleet while Russia will reconsider the Crimean question."⁶⁰

The statement of the Ukrainian President obviously ran contrary to the declared position of Ukraine on nuclear problems and produced an immediate negative reaction in Moscow and the Western capitals. During the following fortnight, several statements emanated from Ukrainian official sources, some of them quite contradictory. On 21 March, President Leonid Kravchuk, in a telephone conversation with President George Bush, assured Bush that Ukraine "would do its best to satisfy the wishes of the world" concerning the fate of nuclear weapons. Later, President Bush commented that the situation "is developing in the right direction."⁶¹

But, at the news conference after the Kiev summit, President Leonid Kravchuk angrily denied that he had telephoned President Boris Yeltsin to say he had reversed his decision to suspend the withdrawal of tactical weapons.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel General Konstantin Morozov announced, after the Kiev summit, that no tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from Ukraine since President Kravchuk's statement. According to General Morozov, "nuclear weapons are withdrawn from units and removed to special storage bases under reliable defense."⁶² He did not mention who was defending those bases.

Later, Lieutenant General Ivan Bizhan, First Deputy Defense Minister of Ukraine, admitted that the Ukrainian Parliament planned to discuss, in a closed session, changes in the denuclearization stand. General Bizhan denied that Ukraine would give up nonnuclear status as its official goal, because it is defined in the Declaration of Sovereignty of Ukraine. But the Declaration did not affix any specific date. "If a mechanism of control over destruction of tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukraine is not established, Ukraine may fail to meet the deadline for the withdrawal of weapons,"⁶³ said General Bizhan.

The Main Command of the CIS confirmed that, by the end of March, 57 percent of tactical nuclear warheads had been withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia. But 2,390 tactical nuclear charges and 1,420 strategic warheads remained in Ukraine.⁶⁴

According to Lieutenant General Zelenzov, Ukraine stopped the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia on February 23, three weeks before President Kravchuk's public announcement. According to Chief of the General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, Colonel General Victor Samsonov, this decision may be linked to the dispute over the Black Sea Fleet: "The first violations of the schedule happened because of the naval issue. They suggested that we start withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons with the Navy and promised to agree to the withdrawal of other nuclear weapons later. We changed our timetable and I ordered the withdrawal of sea-based weapons; we had about 100 warheads there."⁶⁵

General Zelenzov expressed doubt about Kravchuk's proposal to build a special plant to dismantle nuclear warheads in Ukraine. Although the project would require a multibillion-ruble investment, the dismantled facilities could also be used to manufacture nuclear warheads.⁶⁶ Colonel General Victor Samsonov said that, if Ukraine creates its own dismantling facilities, it "automatically violates the nonnuclear principles that it has declared."⁶⁷ While claiming that nobody can get access to the CIS nuclear weapons, General Zelenzov, in fact, recognized that those procedures can work only when the political situation is stable. "We have a program against saboteurs and terrorists, but we don't have it against unilateral political decisions."⁶⁸

The decision of President Kravchuk met serious criticism. "An end to removal of nuclear weapons and efforts by Ukraine to become their owner means a fragrant violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,"⁶⁹ said General Zelenzov.

CIS Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Viktor Samsonov, disclosed that there are four "excellent" plants for dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia, but admitted lack of sufficient storage space. General Samsonov suggested that the Ukrainian decision "is being used as a leverage to solve the Black Sea Fleet problem" and concluded: "The declarations of President Kravchuk are simply a political game. They are not technically sound and are made to force other states, first of all Russia, to speak to Ukraine as a nuclear state."⁷⁰

The Main Command of the Unified Armed Forces, in fact, almost admitted that not all the nuclear warheads transferred from Ukraine were scheduled for dismantling. "Nobody ever promised that all weapons withdrawn from Ukraine will be destroyed," claimed General Zelenzov. "In accordance with the Russian-American agreement on reductions of tactical nuclear weapons, we have to reduce about half of the nuclear armaments of the

Navy, the same share of air defense weapons, and about a third of ground-based weapons. The first to be destroyed are those systems, whose lifetimes have reached the end. That's why it's possible to destroy 10 percent of 'Ukrainian' warheads and 90 percent of Russian warheads.⁷¹

A dangerous confrontation resulted from the Ukrainian decision to control units of strategic aviation deployed in Ukraine. The Main Command agreed to give Ukraine three armies of tactical aviation in Kiev, Lvov, and Odessa. But Ukraine took under its control six regiments of Military Transportation Aviation (about 200 Il-76 cargo planes).⁷² The cargo planes belong to the 6th and 7th divisions based in Melitopol and Krivoy Rog.

The commander of the 106th Heavy Bombers Division, Major General Mikhail Bashkirov, also transferred his loyalty to Ukraine. The division, which consists of two ALCMs TU-95Mc bomber regiments with 24 planes each (one regiment is based in Mozdok, Russia, and another regiment is based in Usen, Ukraine) and a tanker regiment (30 Il-78 tankers), was divided. The tanker regiment and 25 percent of the Uzen bomber regiment pilots took an oath of allegiance to Ukraine, while others refused.⁷³

Marshal Shaposhnikov fired General Bashkirov and replaced him with another officer, but Ukrainian defense Minister Konstantin Morozov reappointed General Bashkirov.

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry tried to prohibit the Commander of the Air Force of the Commonwealth, Colonel General Pyotr Deinekin, from visiting the strategic aviation bases in Ukraine, alleging that "the Command of the Air Force is consciously trying to remove aircraft from Ukraine and undermine the readiness of the Ukrainian Air Force."⁷⁴ When General Deinekin tried to justify his visit with the need to coordinate the transport of military personnel from the Trans-Caucasian military district, the Ukrainian government announced that it was going to use "its" Military Transportation Aviation to evacuate the military of Ukrainian origin from that district.⁷⁵

General Deinekin compared the Ukrainian action toward the 106th Division to a "castration."⁷⁶ With two commanders, the tension in the division reached a point where one of the commanders of strategic bombers said: "The conflict in our unit came to the point beyond which we can have a serious trouble."⁷⁷ During his visit to Ukraine, General Deinekin mentioned the possibility of redeploying the Uzen bomber regiment to Russia to save it as a component of Strategic Forces.⁷⁸

If Ukraine has made a vague commitment to denuclearize, Kazakhstan never formally pledged to remove strategic nuclear weapons from its territory. The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, made it clear that his republic would keep ICBMs even when they are removed from Ukraine.

During his visit to India, in February 1992, President Nazarbayev stated: "Kazakhstan supports the principle of parity in the question of elimination of nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan will be ready to eliminate its nuclear potential only on the condition if the United States, China, and Russia do the same."⁷⁹

Burkutbul Ayaganov, an official from the Office of the President of Kazakhstan, said in an interview:

First of all, as a nuclear state, Kazakhstan can be equal among sovereign states. It should be also taken into an account that, geographically, our state is a bridge between East and West and is bound to be surrounded by three mighty powers—Russia; China, with a one-billion-person population; and the Muslim East, where the need for nuclear weapons has been openly discussed. In my view, Kazakhstan will be more secure with strategic nuclear missiles than without them.⁸⁰ Mr. Ayaganov also said that "when nuclear weapons remain only in Russia and Kazakhstan...we have to conclude a bilateral agreement between the two states, which will strengthen the responsibility of each side for decisions to use nuclear weapons.⁸¹

Lieutenant General Sergey Zelenzov, from the Main Command of CIS Unified Armed Forces, denied reports about the sale of two nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan to Iran. According to General Zelenzov, the last warhead was removed from Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics last year.⁸² Deputy Chairman of the Kazakhstan State Committee for Defense, Seydabek Altybayev, announced that "all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from the territory of the republic."⁸³

Even in Belarus, where antinuclear feelings are strong because of the Chernobyl disaster, there have been some new developments. Belarusian politicians have made several statements concerning possible changes in the Belarusian decision to achieve nonnuclear status. The Belarusian government never established a deadline for elimination of nuclear weapons on its territory. That means that Belarus can follow Ukraine if it refuses to implement its commitment to denuclearize. But most likely, those signals reflect the wish to attain something for the removal of strategic weapons (54 road-mobile single Warhead SS-25 ICBMs) from its territory.

For instance, acting Defense Minister Lieutenant General Petr Chaus said, in February, that Belarus "shouldn't rush to transfer nuclear weapons to anybody." Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich suggested that Belarus should "temporarily stop transfers of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons from its territory," declaring that "a strong state must have nuclear weapons. Nobody would even speak to a nonnuclear state."

These statements probably reflect a desire to gain something in return for giving up the nuclear weapons that Belarus can hardly maintain economically and politically. This may explain a suggestion by Belarus Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko that the transfers of nuclear weapons might slow unless the West helps with: (1) deactivation of the contaminated regions where nuclear weapons have been deployed, (2) the social rehabilitation of personnel who serviced those weapons, and (3) the establishment of export control over nuclear materials. The newspaper of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, *Narodnaya Gazetta*, was more blunt when it declared: "Belarus has the right to ask whether the West will compensate its voluntary agreement to give up the status of a nuclear state."⁸⁴

There have been unconfirmed reports about nuclear weapons in other republics of the former Soviet Union. These republics have allegedly tried to sell nuclear weapons to Iran and other countries. The Main Command has strongly denied the reports, stating that all nuclear weapons from those republics had been removed to Russia. The General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces also denied that tactical nuclear weapons are still in the Trans-Caucasian military district.⁸⁵

The CIS Main Command claims that it is still able to ensure adequate control of nuclear forces. "The main task today is guaranteed control over nuclear weapons. I'm able to guarantee that the General Staff and special units securely implement this duty,"⁸⁶ claimed Colonel General Victor Samsonov, Chief of the General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. "Despite the political uncertainty, the command and control of the Armed Forces lingers. The situation is under control; the services implement their missions and global developments are being monitored,"⁸⁷ said General Kuznetsov, deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff.

But this control is challenged by the efforts of Ukraine to gain complete independence in military affairs. On April 5, President Leonid Kravchuk signed a decree, which subordinated all military forces deployed on its territory to Ukraine, including strategic forces. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry established a special command center for strategic forces, including long-range aviation.⁸⁸ On May 14, 1992, the Defense Ministry of Ukraine took control of long-range aviation units (strategic bombers) on Ukrainian territory.⁸⁹

Ukrainian officials explained that this action related only to administrative matters like personnel appointments, material and financial support, protection of the social rights of the military, etc., while operational control would remain with the Main Command of the Strategic Forces of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. At the same time, however, Ukraine made it clear that it will not be a participant in the Unified Armed Forces. In time, Ukraine's control over personnel will probably give it actual control over nuclear weapons.

Marshal Shaposhnikov has said that this action has established a precedent for nationalization of the Strategic Forces and has violated earlier CIS agreements. He announced that the CIS Main Command has asked all leaders of the republics where Strategic Forces are deployed to either confirm the decisions adopted in Minsk and Alma-Ata or to reconsider them.⁹⁰

According to the newspaper *Red Star*, "It's not clear whether Ukraine has become a nuclear power, after it took under its administrative control the strategic nuclear forces, deployed on its territory. The Command of Strategic Forces will keep operational control, but by losing control over personnel appointment and other vital functions, its control will soon become superficial."⁹¹

Following the creation of its own Armed Forces, Russia brought all strategic installations under its jurisdiction, but confirmed that these installations would remain under the operational control of the CIS Strategic Forces. Although Kazakhstan and Belarus refrained from following this step, this decision, together with Ukraine's policies, indicate the strong possibility of a "nationalization" of the Soviet nuclear legacy.

On May 6, 1992, Lieutenant General Sergey Zelenzov announced that all Ukrainian-based tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn to Russia. According to General Zelenzov, the Main Command had moved about 1,000 warheads from Ukraine since the withdrawal had been resumed.⁹² Apparently, Ukrainian authorities were not fully aware of this speedy transfer. The complete withdrawal was at first denied by Ukrainian President Kravchuk, who was then in Washington meeting with President George Bush. He later admitted, however, that this was true, but added that the nuclear weapons of the Black Sea Fleet had not yet been withdrawn.⁹³ However, Colonel Nikolay Medvedev, from the press office of the Main Command, announced, in Moscow, that tactical nuclear weapons had also been withdrawn from the Black Sea Fleet.⁹⁴

Observers commented that "the very fact that the President was unfamiliar with the situation involving his nuclear arsenal, and that he gave wrong information to American statesmen and the world public, has obviously not helped his prestige."⁹⁵

Yet, the Protocol on Ratification of the START Treaty, which was agreed upon during Kravchuk's visit to Washington, seemed to produce a major victory for Ukraine. This Protocol provided Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus equal status with Russia in the ratification and implementation of the obligations of START. It recognized all four former Soviet republics as "successors" of the Soviet Union (Article 1). The Protocol denies any special rights for Russia regarding Soviet strategic weapons, and stipulates that Russia must negotiate arrangements concerning the ceilings and limitations imposed by START (Article 2) with Ukraine and the other two republics. Thus, nuclear weapons may remain on the territories of these states even after the START reductions. In fact, this might be used by Ukraine and others to claim not only *de facto*, but also *de jure* nuclear status.

Apparently, the United States expected to neutralize these concessions in Article 5 of the Protocol by committing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to join the NPT as non-nuclear states. This provision, however, doesn't specify a signature date and is dependent on the constitutional process in those republics. Thus, article 5 may be as ineffective as the previous pledges of Ukraine (for instance, at the CIS summit in Alma-Ata in December 1991) to join the NPT.

This conclusion is supported by the letter delivered by President Kravchuk to President Bush, in which Ukraine pledged to adhere to the "three nonnuclear principles," but retains its self-proclaimed right to control "non-use of nuclear weapons, deployed on its territory." Kravchuk also promised to destroy all nuclear weapons in seven years, thus violating the previous commitment by Ukraine to destroy them by the end of 1994. This promise is conditioned by considerations of "national security" and the right of Ukraine "to consult other parties." In addition, the elimination of nuclear weapons is also conditioned by requirements for international control, guarantees of non-use of components of nuclear charges for the reproduction of nuclear weapons, and prevention of their export to other states. This stipulation looks like a claim to ownership of these weapons (or at least a denial of such ownership by Russia).

Thus, the Protocol did not remove any uncertainty over the nuclear intentions of Ukraine. If Ukraine and the other republics, under some pretext, refuse to join the NPT, they will be in a perfect position to use the Protocol to keep portions of the Soviet nuclear legacy. Thus, the Protocol does not conclude the issue, but opens the way for an extended period (at least seven years) of maneuvering on this issue.

The United States has retreated from its original position, which supported bilateral ratification of START with only Russia (the full inheritor of the nuclear status of the Soviet Union). By accepting the vague promises made by Ukraine, the Bush Administration apparently refused to protect Russia's claim to be "the continuator" of the USSR, especially when Russia failed to take a more active stand against the nuclear pretenses of the three other republics.

It is significant that the Foreign Ministry of Russia, which for some time assured the Department of State that the republics would give up their claims (but failed to pressure them seriously), did not protest the reversal of the American position. The last hope of the Russian Foreign Ministry is a possible linkage between the exchange of the START Treaty ratification documents and the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the three republics.

Russia has demonstrated a very confused attitude toward nuclear questions. It made claims on the nuclear weapons in other republics immediately after the failed coup d'etat in August 1991, but when rebuffed by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Russia dropped the issue. At the Alma-Ata summit, in December 1991, Russia agreed to four-party control over nuclear weapons. Since then, however, Russia has practically kept its Commonwealth partners in the dark about the CIS nuclear policy by failing to establish any joint policy-making bodies. It has also failed to consult properly with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus about its nuclear arms reductions negotiations with the United States.

Apparently, Russia hopes to conclude a deal with Kazakhstan and Belarus, thus isolating Ukraine and forcing it to denuclearize. This approach became obvious when Russia refused to pressure Nazarbayev into forcing Kazakhstan to denuclearize. The former Soviet General Staff is more concerned about retention of some of the SS-20 ICBMs deployed there than about possible nationalization of those weapons by Kazakhstan.

In a joint letter to President Bush dated May 17, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev informed him that after the implementation of the START Treaty, Russia and Kazakhstan will settle the question of further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Kazakhstan.⁹⁶

After his meeting with President Yeltsin, but before his departure for the United States, President Nazarbayev announced that Kazakhstan would join the NPT as a non-nuclear state.⁹⁷ As President Nazarbayev admitted, this change in Kazakhstan's position could be explained by two factors. First, Russia and Kazakhstan became military allies and, after signing the Collective Security Treaty, Kazakhstan secured for itself the Russian "nuclear umbrella." Second, Kazakhstan succeeded in obtaining an agreement with the U.S. that Kazakhstan would participate in the negotiations on strategic arms. The U.S. also reaffirmed its "commitment" to protect those nonnuclear states that ratify the START Treaty.⁹⁸

The attainment of nuclear power status by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus will have disastrous effects on the evolving international system. For instance, Ukraine might inherit 176 ICBMs (130 SS-19s and 46 SS-24s in silos) with 1,360 strategic nuclear warheads, some Blackjack strategic bombers, and a few thousand tactical nuclear warheads. This amount is more than presently possessed by Great Britain, France, China, and Israel combined. Kazakhstan has 104 SS-18 heavy missiles with 1,040 strategic

warheads, Bear-H strategic bombers, and a substantial number of tactical warheads. These holdings make Kazakhstan the largest nuclear power in Asia (besides Russia).

While these republics today lack crucial elements of C³I and cannot develop and produce nuclear weapons and their delivery systems independently, they can achieve such capability in the future with or possibly without foreign help. According to media reports, there are about 400 different plants in Ukraine that are involved in the production of different equipment for the Strategic Missile Forces. Russia stopped procurement from most of those enterprises.⁹⁹ Ukraine also stopped the transfer of some of the spare parts produced on its territory to Russia.¹⁰⁰ It was announced that the "Yuzhnoye" missile design and building complexes in Dnepropetrovsk were ordered to stop the production of strategic ICBMs (SS-24s) in the beginning of March.¹⁰¹ But this kind of confrontation, fraught with disruption of normal functions of the infrastructure of the former Soviet Strategic Forces, can result in accidents and other deviant situations.

The fact that the three republics have achieved equal status in the ratification of the START Treaty may affect the U.S.'s continued adherence to the ABM Treaty. The Soviet-American ABM agreement is closely connected to reductions of strategic offensive weapons. Now that there are four successors to START, there may be uncertainty over the question of succession to the ABM treaty. Will Russia be able to remain the only inheritor of the Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty or will Ukraine and other republics also make claims? The controversy over this issue may be fatal to the survival of the ABM Treaty.

It seems that the problem of nuclear proliferation, both "internal" (within the former Soviet Union) and "external" (transfer of weapons, technologies, and specialists to other countries), can be prevented only if all former Soviet republics join the NPT as nonnuclear states. Their lack of desire to join the NPT reflects the desire of some political leaders in those states to keep their options open. Thus, an early clarification of the legal status of these states may be the most effective way to remove this ambiguity and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.

Finally, additional arms control measures that go beyond the provisions of START may be necessary to guarantee the elimination of all strategic weapons and their means of delivery in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

THE SOVIET MILITARY: AN ARMY IN SEARCH OF A STATE

After the collapse of the USSR, the Soviet military found itself in an awkward position—it had lost the state, which it was supposed to defend and by which it expected to be taken care of. The situation of the military was aggravated by an accumulation of many problems, which the previous leadership of the Soviet Defense Ministry ignored or did not want to solve.

Discussing the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Colonel General Victor Samsonov, Chief of the General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, said:

It's going to be difficult to defend ourselves in the event of a military conflict. The first strategic echelon is completely destroyed and this is not a secret. The reason is that to create the forces of the first echelon we put everything into the border areas—Kiev, Carpathian, Baltic military districts, etc. That's why we wanted to include the air defenses in the Strategic Forces and count them as collective security means. But it unfortunately didn't happen, so everything collapsed. And, in the Trans-Caucasian district, we dismantled all radar posts because they were attacked more often than combat units. In other words, our defenses, especially in the South, are tremendously weakened. And, if we have to fight, this can be done only by forces deployed in the Center. The centralized defense system doesn't exist any more.¹⁰²

According to General Samsonov, "The nationalization of the troops, which are deployed on the territory of some of the states, the ambitions of some of the political leaders, unilateral decisions on military questions, and the unwillingness of political leaders to compromise have created serious problems for the General Staff in its attempt to control the forces."¹⁰³ Samsonov revealed that, in 1992, there were 305 attacks on military facilities, including 34 storage sites. As a result, 31 soldiers were killed and 72 wounded, and 7,500 weapons and 500 military vehicles were stolen. Most of the accidents (265) happened in the Caucuses, but even in central Russia there were 8 attacks (twice as many as in Central Asia (4) and Siberia (4)).¹⁰⁴

According to Air Force Marshal Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, "continued economic crisis and break up of economic ties have had an extremely negative impact on the mechanism for maintenance, food, and technical supply of the Armed Forces, and on the military preparedness of the troops and staffs."¹⁰⁵ Shaposhnikov also admitted that "withdrawal of forces from Germany, Poland, and Mongolia has extremely aggravated the problem of their deployment in new locations, housing for officers, and warrant-officers and their family members."¹⁰⁶

In February 1992, the Armed Forces Center for sociological, psychological, and legal studies conducted a poll among 1,200 officers and warrant-officers in 10 military bases in the Russian Federation. The results of the poll demonstrated an unprecedented level of unhappiness among the military of the CIS, as well as a growing polarization of opinions and mistrust of political authorities. The main reason for low morale is a growing concern

about economic conditions. Ninety percent believe that their standard of living is lower than a year ago. (In comparison, in 1991, 70 percent of officers were dissatisfied with their living conditions.)¹⁰⁷

The military complains that, unless the government ensures a decent standard of living, forces should not be "prohibited from participation in commercial activities" and should be allowed to have additional income. The military is afraid that additional social benefits promised by President Yeltsin will not be implemented.

Only 17 percent support the policies of the Russian government, while 56 percent disagree with them. Thirty-nine percent believe relations between the military and local civilian authorities are deteriorating and, 8 percent admit that there have been some conflicts. Thirty-six percent complain about worsening relations with the local population, and 84 percent think that social tensions will keep growing and could result in public riots.

Seventy-six percent are concerned that the division of the Soviet Army between the republics may lead to conflicts between the military forces of independent states, making former fellow-soldiers fight on different sides. (According to another poll, 67 percent of the officers think that the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union should remain undivided).¹⁰⁸

Also reported in the poll, 43 to 47 percent complained about the announced decision to cut the Armed Forces by 700,000 men, and 37 percent thought that this decision was "absolutely wrong." Ninety percent, however, believe that the military should not be responsible for government policy and that civilians should run the government.¹⁰⁹

Even more worrisome are the results of a poll among the participants of the Officers' Assembly held on January 17, 1992, which received a lot of attention as the first effort in many decades to organize the military into a separate political force.

Major Vladimir Lopatin, a radical reformer, commented on the Officers' Assembly:

The military leadership saw the Officers' Assembly not as means to democratize the Army, but as an instrument to defend its interests and, through it, to directly participate in the struggle for power on the interstate level. The results, in fact, legalized the right of the military leaders to act as an independent political force. This corresponds to a situation when functions of political, administrative, and military guidance are combined in the same structure; when the Armed Forces are subordinate only to the Commander-in-Chief because there are no other decisions; when the Army was only partially freed from party control and is now tremendously "re-particized" [politicized], for instance by the involvement of the military in political parties and movements; finally when each political force tries to play a game with the military establishment, which skillfully uses their contradictions (including contradictions in Russian leadership) to secure its positions.¹¹⁰

Among participants of the Officers' Assembly in January, only 8 percent were young officers, while more than 57 percent had served in the Armed Forces for more than 20 years. This explains the very conservative mood of the Officers' Assembly. Seventy-eight percent of senior officers and 55 percent of junior officers supported the idea of the restoration of the Soviet Union. Younger officers were more open to the idea of forming CIS Allied Forces than to the retention of the former Soviet Army.

Many participants, particularly from the border districts, expected that some units could soon get out of control. This possibility was admitted by 78 percent of officers from the Trans-Caucasian district, 75 percent from the Trans-Carpathian district, and 71 percent from the North-Western group of forces (Baltic States).¹¹¹

The composition of the Officers' Assembly underrepresented the lower ranks of military officers and appeared more conservative than the officers' corps as a whole. This demonstrates that many top military officers tend to support a rather reactionary position.

Marshal Shaposhnikov admitted after the Officers' Assembly: "Unfortunately some of our officers still don't understand where we live, in what time, in what country. They still think they live in a single Soviet Union. Those people agree to put political pressure on presidents, to use force methods and the language of ultimatums."¹¹² He recognized that "by sending ultimatums to presidents, the Army would have presented an ultimatum to the people it has to serve." But he claimed that these officers constitute a minority.¹¹³

Only 19 percent of the respondents agreed that "the Army should wait for political decisions on the Armed Forces," while an astonishing 79 percent believed that "the military should have the decisive say on questions related to the future of the Armed Forces."¹¹⁴

This poll also provided ratings for leading politicians. The most popular political leader was Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev (65 percent—for, 1 percent—against), followed by Russia's Vice President General Alexander Rutskoy (36 percent—for, 3 percent—against), and right-winger Colonel Victor Alksnis (29 percent—for, 8 percent—against). Only 4 percent sympathized with Mikhail Gorbachev (45 percent against) and 4 percent supported Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk (46 percent against). Russian President Boris Yeltsin was approved by 21 percent, while 26 percent took a negative stand against him.¹¹⁵ The poll indicated the military's growing independence and its desire to act as a self-contained corporate body irrespective of the political environment.

Marshal Shaposhnikov admitted that Russian President "Yeltsin has been concerned about the Officers' Assembly. I personally thought that there may be some extremist proposals, but didn't expect the situation getting out of control. Formation of the Coordinating Council is a good solution. This council works in close coordination with the leadership of the Armed Forces and officers."¹¹⁶

The possible independent role of the military is becoming a growing concern. A report by the Center RF-Politika (Informational and Analytical Center of the Russian Federation), which reflects views of radical liberals, took notice: "There is talk among the military about a possibility and necessity for a change of government, because 'the

President is sick.' Officers in some units near Moscow received instructions on 'temporary responsibilities' for civilian government 'in case of an emergency.'"¹¹⁷

According to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, "The military is concentrating a terrible power and can force us to go where we all don't want to go."¹¹⁸ Even the former Soviet Defense Ministry's newspaper *Red Star* demanded "special measures to prevent the military from turning into a self-organizing force ready to start an independent struggle to defend its interests."¹¹⁹

Before the CIS summit in Kiev in March 1992, another opinion poll demonstrated that only 27 percent of officers were satisfied with the decisions of the previous Minsk summit, while 59 percent were dissatisfied. And 64 percent doubted that the Kiev summit would solve military problems.¹²⁰

At its meeting in mid-March, the Coordinating Council of the Officers' Assembly called for an immediate freeze on the creation of national armies by former Soviet republics and a transition period to be protracted until 1995. The co-chairman of the Coordinating Council, Captain 1st Rank Alexander Mochaikin, demanded that Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova not be allowed to have their own military forces before the political problems there are solved by political means. Captain Mochaikin also criticized the Moscow authorities for their decision to use police against pro-Soviet and pro-Communist demonstrators on February 23 (the official holiday "the Day of the Soviet Army").¹²¹

Some participants in the meeting wanted the Coordinating Council to be given an official status and become "a governmental body."¹²² The Coordinating Council requested that the Commonwealth "determine the mechanism of officer participation in the process of privatization (of government property) and to assure that their rented apartments become their property without any compensation."¹²³ It demanded "the right to control the commercial activities related to sales" of military property in the Baltic states.¹²⁴

The Coordinating Council also took a position against what it claims is a plan to reduce the former Soviet Navy by 34 percent.¹²⁵ It demanded that the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces coordinate with the council the plans and the schedule for withdrawal and disbandment of military units. It also supported the decision of the Officers' Assembly of the North-Western Group of Forces, deployed in the Baltic states, not to withdraw or disband units until the necessary social conditions are created for military personnel and their families.¹²⁶ The Coordinating Council also urged that officers be allowed to use their personal weapons and be "ordered to use them if necessary to defend military personnel, members of their families, and property of the Armed Forces."¹²⁷

The Coordinating Council appealed to the Kiev summit, demanding that it should adopt a treaty on collective security of the Commonwealth and a military doctrine for the CIS, and that it establish an Interstate Committee on military policy and reform. It warned that, if the heads of states again ignore those demands, the council would convoke an emergency meeting of the Officers' Assembly. "Today the joint efforts of the officers can change the situation in the Armed Forces; tomorrow it will be too late,"¹²⁸ said the Council.

The military loudly complained when the Russian government, in the beginning of 1992, raised pay for the personnel of the Internal Affairs Ministry and the Federal Security Agency (former KGB) by 50 to 100 percent, demanding that Russia should also raise pay for the officers of the Armed Forces.¹²⁹ The deteriorating morals of the military have lead to cases of insubordination. At the Bratsk air base in Siberia, the officers reacted to the decision by local authorities to raise the pay for personnel in kindergartens and nursery schools by refusing to perform their duties and threatening to go on strike.¹³⁰

The Soviet military became involved in numerous political, ethnic, and territorial conflicts on the territory of the former USSR, sometimes being attacked by both parties to the conflict. One hundred and fifteen servicemen, including 33 officers, were killed, in internal ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union in 1991 and the first months of 1992.¹³¹

In mid-February 1992, Marshal Shaposhnikov admitted that the units of the CIS Unified Armed Forces had begun their withdrawal from the Chechen republic "because the government of that republic couldn't guarantee the security of the military personnel and their family members."¹³² As *Red Star* said: "The officers don't just passively wait. There are cases when some of them reach the brink and take extreme actions."¹³³

Meanwhile, the Officers' Assembly of the Baltic border district stated: "We reserve the right to defend our dignity, status, and very existence and the security of our families with all available means.... We count on the solidarity and support of our comrades in arms—soldiers of the North-Western Group of Forces and sailors of the Red Banner Baltic fleet. We believe they won't betray us in this hour of trouble."¹³⁴

The former Soviet border troops in the Baltic states found themselves in a peculiarly strange position—while guarding the borders of foreign states (recognized as independent by the CIS and the international community), they do not belong to any state at all. They remain under the control of the Commonwealth border troops command. The military council of the Baltic (former Soviet) border district requested President Boris Yeltsin to take the district under the jurisdiction of Russia. The council, which refuses to surrender its functions to the newly created border troops of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, apparently chooses not to question why Russian border troops (Russia still formally doesn't have border troops of its own) should guard the borders of foreign states.

The accumulation of political and social problems has lead to speculations that some members of the former Soviet military may choose to become mercenaries. According to *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, there is a huge pool of mercenaries in the former Soviet Union with "many experienced servicemen from the police and the KGB, the spetsnaz (special forces of the army), marines, paratroopers, and internal troops."¹³⁵

For instance, mercenaries from other republics (mostly Ukraine) were reported to be among the forces that fought on the side of the President Gamsahurdia during the mini-civil war in Georgia in winter 1992.¹³⁶ There have been reports that a squadron of combat helicopters near Baku is manned by mercenaries. The pilots of these helicopters receive 10,000 rubles for each sortie.¹³⁷ It's alleged that the Azerbaijanian forces, fighting against Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh, are supported by 30 tanks and AIFVs of the 4th Army's 23rd Motorized Rifle Division, which is deployed in Azerbaijan.¹³⁸ It is alleged that

drivers and gunners from the former Soviet Armed Forces are the most highly paid mercenaries.

Para-military forces were formed not only in other republics, but in Russia itself. For instance, reestablishment of the Cossack forces was announced in a number of regions of Russia. The self-ruling Cossack council has begun active involvement in political, ethnic, and territorial conflicts.

In October 1991, "the Dniester Cossacks" appealed to Cossacks in other regions to help them against Moldova. This appeal received a positive response from the Congress of Cossacks of South Russia, which decided to send volunteers to the Dniester republic. Most of them have a military background, having served previously in commando battalions and spetsnaz units. The Dniester republic arms the Cossacks, who have to present their passports and military reserve cards to receive weapons. The Cossacks sign contracts with the local authorities and receive money ("less than a floor-sweeper at the Moscow underground").¹³⁹

By other accounts, the Cossack involvement was orchestrated by the former Defense Ministry of the Soviet Union, and the volunteers were handsomely paid 2,500 to 3,500 rubles.¹⁴⁰

According to media reports, the Cossacks from the Don region who came to the self-proclaimed Dniester republic (it seceded from Moldova) are mostly airborne forces (paratroopers). They were paid 2,500 to 3,000 rubles for their job as defenders of this "republic." It is claimed that the Defense Ministry of the former USSR suggested to the so-called Union of Cossack troops that it pay for the weapons and transportation of the volunteers from the Don region to Moldova. But later the Defense Ministry changed its position, proclaiming its neutrality.¹⁴¹

President Snegur called them "mercenaries," but the Cossacks themselves denied it, claiming that they fight to save their compatriots. Declared Fedor Parchukov, a former helicopter pilot and a Cossack leader of a detachment, which came to defend the Dniester republic:

No government sent us. We came here ourselves and we shall go back, if this is decided by the Cossack Circle [the self-governing Cossack body]. I personally have greater sympathy for the ideology of [the Moldovan President] Snegur than for the ideology of the Dniester republic with their red flags. We also want to have an independent Cossack Don republic. I like Snegur but we came here to defend the Russians.¹⁴²

The Chief of the Don region Cossacks, S. Mesheryakov, said that the Cossack presence in the Dniester region doesn't mean interference into the affairs of a sovereign state because the Cossacks didn't go there as mercenaries.¹⁴³

The Presidential Administrator of the Rostov District sent a letter to Vice President Alexander Rutskoy suggesting that Cossack regiments in the National Guard of Russia and

special Cossack junior cadet schools be created.¹⁴⁴ In March 1992, there was a meeting of the Council of Leaders of Cossack Forces in the town of Yuzhno-Sahalinsk. The Cossacks demanded that the Russian government give up any discussion of the future of the Kuril islands and suggested that Cossacks would take responsibility for defense of Russian borders there.¹⁴⁵ Marshal Shaposhnikov said that he opposed the idea of the formation of separate Cossack troops and suggested that Cossacks should be used to man some units of the Unified Armed Forces.¹⁴⁶

The problem of providing manpower for the Armed Forces has reached serious proportions. Colonel General Samsonov admitted that the Armed Forces, on the eve of the 1992 spring draft, were manned at only 50 percent of the manpower level. Furthermore, Russia can provide only 22 percent of needed conscripts.¹⁴⁷

According to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth, United Armed Forces Colonel General Boris Pyankov, Marshal Evgeniy Shaposhnikov asked him, in February 1992, to prepare suggestions about contract service for volunteers. The proposal of Pyankov's group provided for contract service for young men who reached the draft age; for draftee soldiers and sailors, who spent not less than 6 months of military service; for other eligible men younger than 40 years old; and for unmarried women without children and for spouses of the servicemen, except those who have children of pre-school age. Contracts will be signed for three years and can later be prolonged for five or ten years. The volunteers are promised relatively high salaries (for instance for sergeants—five times higher than the poverty level), food supplies, housing benefits, long vacations, etc.¹⁴⁸ The proposal encourages a high quality of manpower.

Explaining the change in the military leadership's position, Colonel General Pyankov said:

Conscript service in present political conditions becomes practically impossible, because most of the (CIS) states and their parliaments adopted laws forbidding the draftees to serve outside of the republics. This leads to serious problems for the Strategic Forces and also for the General Purpose Forces, especially on Russian territory. Russia alone cannot man even those troops. A contract service system will allow people to be brought here from the entire Commonwealth.¹⁴⁹

The political struggle related to military questions may determine the outcome of the events in the former Soviet Union. The conservative forces are trying to gain the support of the military and sometimes get a positive reception to their ideas for restoring the Soviet Union.

"The collapse of the Soviet Union, without any exaggeration, is going to bring global catastrophe,"¹⁵⁰ says General Nikolay Stolyarov, assistant for personnel to Marshal Shaposhnikov. *Red Star* was sympathetic toward the pro-Communist demonstration that supported the illegal convocation of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the USSR. This Congress wanted to restore officially the Soviet Union.¹⁵¹

In early March, democratic groups expressed concern about ground force staff exercises in the Moscow and Volga-Urals military districts. The leaders of the Democratic Russia movement appealed to first Deputy Prime Minister Gennadiy Burbulis to stop the exercises immediately.¹⁵²

The Center RF-Politika reported that, on February 4, there was a "meeting on questions of economic and national security" attended by about 500 directors of military industry enterprises. These directors formed "a parallel commission" controlled through the Presidential Administration by State advisers Yuriy Skokov and Mikhail Maley, by the industrialist lobby in the Supreme Soviet (V. Ispravnikov), and the Chairman of the Higher Economic Council of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. According to RF-Politika, this Commission, together with the Experts' Council headed by Oleg Lobov, and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs headed by Arkadiy Volsky, can become a substitute for "the Officers' Assembly" for the top economic bureaucracy. The Commission wants to roll back economic reform and restore the power of bureaucracy.¹⁵³

But public opinion in Russia and other former Soviet republics strongly opposes military involvement in politics. Polls in Russia demonstrate that only 12 percent agree that the military should become an independent political force, while 63 percent think the Army should not interfere in politics.

But some trends in public opinion raise concern. For instance, even in Moscow, which is considered the bulwark of liberals, only 45 percent believe the Armed Forces must remain loyal to the government under any circumstances. Twenty-three percent consider that, in some cases, the Army may disobey the government, while 32 percent have no opinion.¹⁵⁴ Most Muscovites (68 percent) believe the Army should remain united and only 15 percent think each Commonwealth state has the right to its own military forces.¹⁵⁵

Thus, the developments within the former Soviet military create major challenges to Russia and the other new nation-states. These challenges are the result of the Soviet Union's collapse.

UKRAINE: THE ROAD TO MILITARY INDEPENDENCE

Ukraine's attitude toward the creation of its own Armed Forces and other military structures is, at present, defined much more clearly than in the other republics of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine's intention to form a Ukrainian Armed Forces was first announced in July 1990 in its Declaration of State Sovereignty. After the referendum for independence on December 1, 1991, Ukraine unequivocally declared its intention to establish its own conventional Armed Forces without any delay. It also agreed to the existence of the common Strategic Nuclear Forces under the Unified Command of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for a short two-year period until all nuclear weapons would be removed from its territory and destroyed under appropriate control.

Some other new-born states (former Soviet republics Moldova, Azerbaijan, and to a certain extent Belarus) pronounced their intention to follow the example of Ukraine by creating Armed Forces of their own. There are also signs that other members of the CIS may move along this path in the not-so-distant future. Therefore, Ukraine's policy deserves a thorough analysis—not only because it explains important military developments in the second largest member of the CIS, but also because, in all probability, it might become a pattern that would be more or less followed by other countries of the Commonwealth.

The August 1991 coup in Moscow gave a new, powerful impetus to the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union and to the emergence of a number of new nation-states on its former territory. Ukraine's Act of Independence was adopted immediately after the failure of the coup. That same day, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted its first legal acts concerning the formation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, also stating its intention to transform the units of the Soviet Armed Forces deployed in its territory.¹⁵⁶

During the fall and winter of 1992, the Ukrainian Parliament devoted much attention to the problems of creating an Armed Force. Now, in the spring of 1992, Ukraine is far ahead of any other former Soviet republic, including Russia, in establishing a legislative base for an Army and Navy. Suffice it to say that, by the end of February 1992, the Ukrainian Parliament had adopted about 70 acts in this field; the second package of bills concerning military matters is now under preparation in its committees and is supposed to be considered by Parliament soon.¹⁵⁷

Ukraine is creating an Armed Forces by taking control of the former Soviet military units deployed on its territory, that is, the units of the former Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian military districts of the Soviet Armed Forces as well as some components of the Black Sea Fleet of the Soviet Navy. According to Ukrainian legislation, all of the weapons, material resources, and real estate of the former Soviet Army and Navy in Ukraine are now transferred to Ukrainian jurisdiction.¹⁵⁸

All of the officers and enlisted men of these units must swear allegiance to Ukraine. Those who refuse to take this oath may, by special arrangements, be transferred to other parts of the CIS or retire in Ukraine. The swearing in of personnel began last January and is ongoing. At this stage, about 400,000 military personnel have taken the oath of

allegiance to Ukraine.¹⁵⁹ Some press reports mentioned that 55 to 90 percent of men have been sworn in.¹⁶⁰

In accordance with CIS agreements on military matters, personnel of the units of the Strategic Forces were supposed to take an oath of allegiance to the CIS and not to the country where their unit is currently deployed. Yet in January 1992, Ukraine began swearing in personnel on its territory, despite protests by the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces and resistance by some generals and officers in Ukraine. For instance, in the Carpathian military district, 3 division commanders, 7 deputy division commanders, 15 regiment commanders, 75 deputy regiment commanders, and 144 battalion commanders refused to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine.¹⁶¹ On January 27, President Leonid Kravchuk replaced all three commanders of military districts in Ukraine. He appointed the former Chief of Staff of the Kiev district Lieutenant General V. Boriskin, Commander of the Kiev district; former tank Army commander, Lieutenant General V. Radetskiy, Commander of the Odessa district; and, former Army commander Lieutenant General V. Stepanov, Commander of the Carpathian district.¹⁶²

Nevertheless, most of the servicemen agreed to switch their loyalty to Ukraine. In many cases not only Ukrainians, but also ethnic Russians agreed to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Ukrainian Defense Minister General Konstantin Morozov (a Russian) leads this process.

Two primary reasons for this peaceful transition were the better economic conditions in Ukraine, and the more friendly attitude by the population toward the military (relative to attitudes in other republics). For many officers of Ukrainian origin, the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces seemed to provide better career opportunities.

Describing the attitude of many top military officers who changed their views and switched allegiances to the Ukrainian government, Lieutenant Colonel Grigoriy Omelchenko, Deputy Chairman of the Union of Ukrainian Officers, commented: "Yesterday, they supported the Emergency State Committee and championed the indivisibility of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces, but today they take a loyalty oath to Ukraine to get high appointments." According to Colonel Omelchenko, this seriously undermined the reliability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces: "That's why we don't have an Army capable of defending the independence of Ukraine."¹⁶³

At the same time, some of the Russian officers purposefully decided to resist "Ukrainization." Such resistance was most obvious in the Black Sea Fleet, where Soviet Navy personnel service was much more comfortable than the harsh conditions of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. While the Black Sea Fleet is not as strong as these other fleets, it nevertheless has quite impressive numbers: 45 large surface ships, about 35 submarines, 300 small and medium size surface ships and boats, 115 naval airplanes, and 85 seaborn helicopters.¹⁶⁴

According to Ukrainian sources, 31 percent of all officers and 62 percent of all sailors in the Black Sea Fleet are ethnic Ukrainians. Ukrainians are also heavily represented in other former Soviet Fleets. For instance, 40 percent of officers and 60 percent of warrant officers of Typhoon strategic submarines are Ukrainians.¹⁶⁵ The dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, therefore, is also connected to the ethnic composition of certain naval units.

While Russians make up about 20 percent of the population of Ukraine, they represent a majority in the Crimea and quite a substantial minority in the Odessa, Herson, Mariupol, Donetsk, and Kharkov regions. This factor created tension when some influential political groups in Russia began to question the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The perception of a Russian threat made effective control over the Black Sea Fleet an urgent necessity for the Ukrainian government.

Such control would literally violate a provision of the December 1991 Minsk agreement, which included the Navy as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Forces and was later abrogated. The Ukrainian government claimed that only ships armed with nuclear weapons belong to the Strategic Forces. Thus, anything else is "conventional" and belongs to Ukraine.

The Ukrainians say that they don't need the aircraft carriers and assault ships of the Black Sea Fleet, but that the Ukrainian Navy should consist of diesel submarines with cruise missiles and torpedoes, surface antisubmarine warfare ships, missile and torpedo boats, land-based aviation, and marine units.¹⁶⁶ Admiral V. Chernavin, Commander of the former Soviet Navy, complained that Ukraine's demands would embrace 91 percent of manpower, 78 percent of ships, and 83 percent of nuclear arms carriers of the Black Sea Fleet. Acceptance of these demands would mean, in his words, "the death of the Black Sea Fleet."¹⁶⁷

Despite the resistance by the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, crews of many of the fleet's ships took the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. Among them were the crews of the largest submarine, the cruiser *Kirov*, and a brigade of marines.¹⁶⁸ It has been reported that about 60 percent of the Black Sea officers are willing to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine.¹⁶⁹

Ukrainian authorities questioned the credentials of Admirals Kasatonov and Chernavin because the CIS never formally appointed them to their positions. "Do we have no patriotic Admirals who can lead the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet? We do have many thousands of excellent Ukrainian sailors and specialists in headquarters and on ships of the CIS Navy,"¹⁷⁰ insisted the newspaper of the Defense Ministry of Ukraine. It demanded that, to reach an early solution to the question of creation of its (Ukraine's) own Black Sea Fleet, "it was necessary to remove immediately Admiral Igor Kasatonov."¹⁷¹

In April 1992, Russia and Ukraine started negotiations on the future of the Black Sea Fleet. The negotiations were closely related to developments in the Crimea, which had announced its intention to conduct a referendum on its independence from Ukraine. The link between the Black Sea Fleet issue and the Crimean question is obvious.

The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian Parliament, Dmitry Pavlychko, who was a member of the Ukrainian delegation, explained:

A greater role will be played during the negotiations by our hopes and Russia's hopes about the Crimea. We have to ensure that Russia relies on the Crimean referendum, which can save its position. We should count on the realization by the Crimeans that, with the decision of the Ukrainian

parliament to divide the functions concerning the Crimea, they will receive great authority. From political, economical, social, and legal points of view, it should be understood that the Fleet cannot exist without the land, which provides it with all the necessities. That's why the Fleet has to belong to Ukraine and Ukraine must make no concessions on this issue.¹⁷²

On April 30, the Commander of the Army Corps in the Crimea, Major General Kuznetsov, refused to transfer his duties to General Paliy, who was sent by Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov to replace Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov claimed that he was replaced because he refused to respond to a question about whether he was ready to fight against Russia.¹⁷³ Only after the Commander of the Odessa military district, accompanied by a group of Ukrainian officers, came to his Headquarters was Kuznetsov removed and later discharged from the Ukrainian Armed Forces by Defense Minister Morozov. Morozov also started a criminal investigation into Kuznetsov's activities. Kuznetsov decided to run for the Crimean Parliament to avoid arrest.¹⁷⁴

At a United Nations news conference, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk strongly criticized Russia: "Russia immediately declared that it was the successor to the Soviet Union, although nobody authorized Russia to do it.... Russia captured the treasury, which had been produced by the labor of all peoples [of the Soviet Union]."¹⁷⁵ He gave the following explanation of the Ukrainian position: "The essence of it is that each state, on which territory the Armed Forces are deployed, independently determines which Armed Forces and how many it needs. Russia takes a different stand, claiming that the entire Navy should belong to the CIS. But this, in fact, means that [the Black Sea Fleet] belongs to Russia, because the entire Navy will be under the Russian flag."

The creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces leads to a serious problem with transfers of military officers; the number of officers of Ukrainian origin from other areas of the former Soviet Union who requested transfer to Ukraine is much higher than the number of officers who refused to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine and want to serve in Russia. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, there is already a surplus of officers; many military academies are situated in Ukraine and many Soviet units were withdrawn to Ukraine from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Germany and later disbanded. Their officers were attached to other units outside of the normal organizational structure.¹⁷⁶

The Ukrainian conscripts who serve all over the former Soviet Union create another problem. According to Ukrainian law, all such draftees should serve within their republic unless they specifically expressed a wish to serve elsewhere. In March 1992, the Ukrainian government decided to recall Ukrainian draftees back home. "We don't prevent those who wish to go to Ukraine," claimed an officer from the Headquarters of the Far Eastern military district, "but according to our polls, more than half of the conscripts from Ukraine agreed to finish their service in the Far East. There are also financial problems because of unforeseen transportation costs, and the Ukrainian government refuses to guarantee the payment for those expenses."¹⁷⁷

In one of its decisions last fall, the Ukrainian Parliament mentioned a quantitative limit of 450,000 servicemen on manpower for Ukraine's Armed Forces. This number would have been a high level of men under arms and the Parliament's intention provoked

an immediate wave of accusations abroad that Ukraine wished to become an "overmilitarized" state. However, according to different estimates, the number of Soviet military personnel deployed in the Ukraine was more than 670,000. Thus, even the upper limit adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament meant a substantive reduction of Armed Forces in Ukraine.

The law providing for a Ukrainian Armed Forces calls for a comparatively high number of military personnel and also reflects the Parliament's understanding that it was simply impossible to demobilize excessively large numbers of men quickly from the existing military formations. Parliament also clearly wished to avoid serious social and economic disturbances. Reductions are regulated by the Act on Social and Legal Defense of Servicemen and Their Families, adopted last December by the Ukrainian legislature. This Act provided for many essential privileges both during service and after retirement.¹⁷⁸

This policy was an effective Ukrainian response to the military's increasing grievances. Ukraine was the first of the CIS countries to adopt such an act, which allowed it to gain the loyalty of most of the military personnel on its territory.

Nevertheless, the numerical limit established by the Ukrainian Parliament should not be taken for granted. In all probability, actual numbers will depend on a variety of domestic and external factors. Many influential politicians in Ukraine, including President Leonid Kravchuk, argue that, in the absence of an external threat, Ukraine will not need such a large Armed Forces. The prevailing opinion is that an Armed Forces with a numerical strength of 100,000 to 200,000 would better correspond to the national security requirements of Ukraine.¹⁷⁹ However, in March, President Leonid Kravchuk stated that the Ukrainian army will consist of 300,000 to 350,000 men.¹⁸⁰

The national economy and deteriorating social conditions are important and compelling factors that may quickly force Ukraine to cut both personnel and weaponry substantially. Any movement along these lines, however, would be carried out only if there is no external threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Ukraine has renounced all possible territorial claims against any of its neighbors and apparently feels strong enough to rebuff any threats to its territory from the south, west, and north. However, statements by Russian officials regarding the status of the Crimea and some other parts of Ukraine created grave apprehensions in Kiev and prompted public pronouncements urging the formation of a stronger Armed Forces.¹⁸¹ Thus, any perception, even false, of an external threat could immediately result in a local arms race between Russia and Ukraine, which could become extremely dangerous and lead to unpredictable consequences.

At the end of February, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense submitted to the Government of Ukraine proposals on the structure of the future Armed Forces. Three new Operative Commands will be established based roughly on the lines of the former military districts: West, South, and Reserve. The Air Force will contain three groups and one group of sea aviation. The Ukrainian Navy will have 16 brigades, a Coast Guard, and its own aviation. According to Defense Ministry plans, the Ground Forces will consist of several corps, encompassing seven to eight divisions, six to seven motorized rifle and tank brigades, six to seven artillery brigades, and two to three brigades of Army aviation. The Air Defense forces (formerly the 8th Air Defense Army) will be included in the Air

Force.¹⁸² The Ukrainian Armed Forces will also have 10,000 railway troops. There will be a military academy, three higher military schools, and four study centers in Ukraine. Six hundred officers will work in the Ministry of Defense.¹⁸³ The Ukrainian Parliament considered a plan to create the Armed Forces in three stages and to complete this process by 1994-1995.¹⁸⁴

All of the main legal acts concerning the establishment of the new independent and democratic Ukraine articulate its firm commitment to become a nonnuclear and neutral state as soon as possible. The notion of neutrality, which is supported by Ukraine, seems to be highly questionable because neutrality only made sense when the world was divided between two superpower camps. Neutrality in the post-Cold War period is losing its traditional meaning. One can possibly be neutral by abstaining from membership in military alliances, but this is probably not neutrality in the strictest terms. President Leonid Kravchuk described the main ideas behind Ukraine's foreign policy as:

Ukraine wants to become a strong economic power. But, first of all, it does not wish to bear the weight of nuclear weapons. Second, we are convinced that a power like Ukraine, situated at the center of Europe and at the crossroads of vital lines between the East and the West, in this unique geopolitical and strategic situation, should be a neutral state. It should show how such a power may indeed become nonaligned, neutral, and nonnuclear and thus serve as an example for others.¹⁸⁵

According to press reports, the first draft of the Ukrainian military doctrine prepared in winter 1992 by the Ministry of Defense translates all three principles enumerated above into practical military terms. This doctrine is based on the principle of "defensive sufficiency" and takes into account the traditions of the Ukrainian people, who claim to have never committed aggressive wars. Ukraine's Armed Forces should be strong enough to defend the state's sovereignty but insufficient for "any act of aggression." The doctrine states that, in spite of Ukraine's renunciation of its nuclear weapons, the military balance in the European region will be preserved since, under existing circumstances, any use of nuclear weapons would be suicidal for the aggressor. Thus, by renouncing expensive nuclear weapons, Ukraine may only profit.¹⁸⁶

Until recently, Ukrainian apprehensions about the future fate of Soviet nuclear weaponry seemed to have no reasonable ground. Both the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine of 16 July 1990 and the Statement by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of 24 October 1991 stated that the country would adhere to three nonnuclear principles: not to accept, not to produce, and not to acquire nuclear weapons. The presence of nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union on Ukraine's territory is only temporary. Ukraine insists on its right to control the non-use of these weapons.¹⁸⁷ The right of Ukraine to veto the use of strategic nuclear weapons is recognized in the CIS agreement.

Ukraine announced that it would follow a policy aimed at the comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons located on its territory. It intends to achieve this policy in the shortest time possible by taking into account legal, technical, financial, and other possibilities.¹⁸⁸ The specific deadlines have already been announced; there will be no

tactical nuclear weapons left in Ukraine by 1 July 1992, and no strategic nuclear weapons by the end of 1994.

But the announcement by President Kravchuk that Ukraine had stopped the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia raised serious doubts about Ukrainian nuclear policy.¹⁸⁹ Although Ukraine has not renounced its goal of achieving nonnuclear status and this pledge was again repeated at the same presidential press conference, slowing down the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons demonstrated that the Ukrainian government's attitude on issues of primary importance could change unpredictably. Of course, such changes might prove to be aimed only at obtaining short-term political advantages, but this does not make such risky maneuvering less alarming.

On the other hand, these events showed that the attitude of the Ukrainian president and government toward nuclear matters might be subject to the influence of extremist forces, particularly in the newly formed military establishment. Those who are opposed to the idea of Ukraine's nuclear-free status constitute a rather odd cluster of traditionally educated military professionals, some former Communist party functionaries, and an extremist wing of rightist nationalist forces.

At present, it is difficult to forecast with certainty whether Kravchuk's statement on tactical nuclear weapons really signifies a new policy approach or whether it is another of a number of quite ordinary political twists and turns prevalent in the CIS. It should be noted, however, that under these circumstances the attitude of the West might play an important role in forming a final political outcome.

Nonnuclear status for Ukraine is officially declared as a political objective and legally binding policy of the country. Of course, there exists a wide spectrum of opinions on this controversial subject. There are people who insist that denuclearization should be realized in a more rapid way, and, as we have already mentioned, there are people who believe that this very process would ruin the military balance and endanger Ukrainian sovereignty.¹⁹⁰ This latter current of public opinion is not as popular in Ukraine where a "Chernobyl syndrome" is now an inseparable part of the psychology of its population. This "peaceful" catastrophe left scars as deep and painful as those felt by the Japanese at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Given the growing conflict with Russia, however, this attitude is changing. Some Ukrainian nationalist groups openly raise the question of nuclear weapons. For instance, the Congress of the Ukrainian republican party, held in the beginning of May, adopted a resolution protesting "the artificial imposition" of a neutral status on Ukraine and the creation of a "toy army." The Congress demanded the immediate organization of a capable Armed Forces to "deter any aggressive actions from other states." The Congress also confirmed the antinuclear stand, but linked full elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine with "simultaneous disarmament of other nuclear states." Taking into account neighboring states' territorial claims on Ukraine, the Republican party considered it "premature" to give up Ukraine's nuclear weapons.

The real test of Ukrainian policy will be its decision to join the NPT. If it fulfills its obligation detailed in the Protocol on Ratification of START, which President Kravchuk agreed to during his trip to Washington, then Ukraine will have to eliminate quickly the strategic weapons on its territory. If Ukraine balks, it will probably become the third

largest nuclear power in the world. It should, however, be noted that, under these circumstances, the attitude of the West might play an important role in forming a final political outcome.

Another important political idea is a nonaligned or neutral status for Ukraine. This concept has been left backstage until the country reaches nonnuclear status. But this idea of permanent and complete neutrality is reflected in the main legislative acts of the Ukrainian Parliament. If and when this idea is further developed, it will become a major influence on Ukraine's foreign policy as well as on politico-military thinking in the country.

The task of achieving neutrality is as challenging as it is difficult. There are no historic precedents for complete and permanent neutrality by states comparable to Ukraine in territory, population, and resources. On the other hand, it seems there are no reasons why this idea could not be realized. The example of Switzerland is testimony to the fact that neutrality, first of all, is the result of a definitive choice made by the people of the country. There are many reasons to believe that the people of Ukraine are now psychologically ready to make such a choice.

The idea of a large neutral state east of Europe fits into the newly emerging system of European and world security. The addition of Ukraine's considerable political, military, and economic capabilities to the existing potential of the neutral states of Europe will substantially strengthen the positive influence of these states on Europe's development.

Should Ukraine achieve complete neutrality, it could open some new and very attractive prospects for stabilization in Europe. For example, it could serve as a serious obstacle for any attempts to form a large military alliance, which would include most of the European nations.

It should be noted, however, that the idea of Ukrainian neutrality is not unanimously accepted in the higher military hierarchy of the country. The Ukrainian press has reported that heated discussions on this problem took place in military circles. Moreover, the recent visit of NATO's Secretary General Manfred Werner to Kiev strengthened the Ukrainian military's position that a nonaligned status for Ukraine might only be temporary and that joining NATO would provide more security at less cost.¹⁹¹

Since Ukraine announced its intention to form its own Armed Forces several months ago, it has formed a High Command and Ministry of Defense and has begun the process of swearing in personnel and forming the first units of its Army and Navy. It remains to be seen how Ukraine's military doctrine and structures will coincide with its declared objectives of denuclearization and neutrality.

At the Tashkent summit, in May 1992, Ukraine refused completely to join the CIS Unified Armed Forces.¹⁹² First Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Bazhan explained the Ukrainian position: "Ukraine has declared already in 1990 that it wouldn't participate in any military alliances or blocks. We also think that the proposed Collective Security Treaty is not obligatory, of a general character. There may be circumstances in which we will join a military alliance, but there is no need to do so now."¹⁹³

Additional uncertainty is created by Ukrainian industrial capabilities. Ukraine has, by some estimates, 10 to 15 percent of the former Soviet defense economic potential.

According to President Kravchuk, there are 344 defense enterprises in Ukraine. Fifty-four enterprises produce 85 percent of Ukrainian military equipment.¹⁹⁴ Thirty-seven percent of the Soviet shipbuilding industry is in the Ukraine.¹⁹⁵

Admiral Igor Kasatonov, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, claimed that "in the Ukraine they look at the fleet as a commercial commodity, which can be profitably sold or exchanged for oil."¹⁹⁶ But supporters of Ukrainian claims have alleged that "under the leadership of V. Chernavin and I. Kasatonov, ships, including ships from the Black Sea Fleet, are sold for scrap, with Russia getting all the profits."¹⁹⁷ According to Ukrainian estimates, 151 submarines and 40 land-assault ships have disappeared.¹⁹⁸

The conflict between Ukraine and the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces encompasses not only nuclear, but also conventional assets. This conflict could result in the collapse of the CFE Treaty.

According to Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov, Ukraine made six proposals to the Main Command of the Unified Armed Forces concerning the division of the Soviet quota of conventional arms in Europe under the terms of the CFE Treaty. According to some reports, Ukraine, supported by Belarus, wishes to abide by about 50 percent of the entire Soviet quota (as was originally planned for the deployment of Soviet troops by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR). This desire is resisted by the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, which wants to deploy almost three-quarters of conventional weapons allowed for the Soviet Union by the CFE in Russia.¹⁹⁹

The conflict between the authorities of Ukraine and the CIS Unified Armed Forces continues to escalate. It cannot be discounted that this may result in Ukraine's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the complete disintegration of that fragile amalgamation of former Soviet republics.

THE PAINS OF BIRTH: BLOODSHED AND NATION-STATE BUILDING

GEORGIA

Military developments in the Caucasian region of the former Soviet Union have taken a much more violent form since the creation of the CIS. Georgia did not apply for membership in the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, its representatives usually participate in the consultations on military questions and were present at the latest Commonwealth meetings.

President Zviad Gamsahurdia miscalculated the loyalty of the National Guard, which was established in the beginning of 1991 to support his drive to full independence from the USSR. The National Guard was harassing Soviet troops in Georgia for some time, trying to capture their weapons, equipment, and facilities. At the same time, the Soviet forces were proclaimed "the occupational Army" and their munitions and equipment declared to be under the republican jurisdiction.

Later, the Commander of the National Guard and some paramilitary groups revolted against Gamsahurdia. Apparently armed formations, which were established by political parties and movements, were loyal to their commanders and not to the government. After several weeks of bloody street battles in Tbilisi, Gamsahurdia was overthrown and fled the country.

Although Georgian leaders took a more positive attitude toward the Commonwealth after the coup, their position has not been clearly defined. The new leaders do not oppose the presence of CIS (former Soviet) military units in Georgia, and the Georgian Parliament abrogated its statement on Soviet occupational troops.

At the same time, the leadership of the Military Council and the temporary government of Georgia asked Marshal Shaposhnikov to transfer some military equipment "in the interest of preserving vital functions of the national economy." The transfer took place at the end of January 1992. The military vehicles and AIFVs were mainly used for the protection of important economic and military facilities.

The struggle for power did not end in Georgia. Though the former president is not likely to return to power, it should be mentioned that Gamsahurdia is engaged in active consultations with General Dudayev, the leader of the Chechen republic that proclaimed its independence from Russia.

Although the commanders of all the Georgian National Guard units were invited to a meeting at Headquarters on February 24, 1992, only leaders of the forces loyal to Tengiz Kitovani participated. At the meeting, it was announced that Kitovani had become Deputy Prime Minister responsible for defense matters. Georgiy Kvarkvadze, former leader of National Guardsmen in western Georgia, was appointed Commander of the National Guard. Kvarkvadze suggested that all militias that fought against deposed President Gamsahurdia and guardsmen should be brought to the barracks.²⁰⁰

Lacking a leader, the organizers of the revolt against President Gamsahurdia invited Edward Shevardnadze, former leading political figure of the "Gorbachev era," back to Georgia. Shevardnadze subsequently became head of Georgia's State Council; following this, the supporters of the deposed President Gamsahurdia resumed military activities. They are currently using weapons supplied by Gamsahurdia's ally, General Dudayev. On March 12, these supporters captured the Commander of the Georgian National Guard Giya Karkarshvili, former Deputy Defense Minister Besik Kutateladze, and 38 National Guardsmen.²⁰¹

Edward Shevardnadze has advocated the creation of a standing Army. "I'm also in support of a centralized, and, by international standards, a professional well-armed and -equipped Army. While it should not have 100,000 but only 15,000 men, it should be a real Army."²⁰² On March 20, the State Council of Georgia approved the proposal of the Defense Ministry to create the Armed Forces of Georgia on the basis of conscription. In spring 1992, Georgia plans to draft about 20,000 young men in the 18 to 25 age group. This decision has been questioned for economic reasons—Georgia hardly has the budget to support such an army.²⁰³

According to the acting Defense Minister Levan Sharashenidze, the Armed Forces of Georgia will be organized into 5 brigades of Ground Forces, the Navy, an Air Defense unit, and 4,000 border guards.²⁰⁴ The detachments of the "Mhedrioni" militia of Jaba Ioseliani and the National Guard of Tengiz Ketovani, however, have refused to disband. Some of the Georgian forces, allegedly the sympathizers of Gamsahurdia, seem to be out of control. They are continuing their attacks against the Southern Osetia region, which wanted to separate from Georgia.

In May, Tengiz Ketovani replaced General Sharashenidze as Defense Minister, and Sharashenidze was appointed State Adviser on Defense Matters. According to observers, this was done to avoid conflict between the newly born National Army and the National Guard.²⁰⁵

It is possible that the continued civil war in Georgia will force its leaders to turn to closer defense cooperation with the CIS and Russia, although present political conditions probably will not allow Georgia to join the Commonwealth formally.

ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN

The situation is even more serious in the two neighboring republics. Armenia and Azerbaijan are practically at war with each other over the region of Nagorno Karabakh. They are also battling Soviet troops for their weapons. An extremely tense situation has developed in Azerbaijan, which signed but did not ratify the Commonwealth documents. It did agree to some of the CIS agreements, but with serious reservations.

Azerbaijan announced that the republic was creating its own Army for "the defense of its borders and territorial integrity, guaranteeing its independence." The Azerbaijani government planned to form its Armed Forces on the basis of the 4th Army of the Trans-Caucasian military district, but the documents adopted by the republican Supreme Soviet stated that, if some military units did not want to assume republican jurisdiction, "their status as well as conditions and terms of their presence in the republic would be elaborated

on the basis of an agreement." According to some unconfirmed reports, Azerbaijan's ground troops consist of four divisions, only partially equipped and armed. Azerbaijan also wishes to create a republican Navy based on the Caspian Sea Flotilla.

Tension between the Commonwealth forces and Azerbaijan, however, was provoked by the decision of the republican Cabinet of Ministers to start "an inventory" of military equipment on republican territory. During a visit to Azerbaijan, high-ranking military officials of the Main Command of the CIS Unified Forces agreed to the "partial transition" to republican jurisdiction of some of the Soviet troops.²⁰⁶ According to the First Deputy Commander of the Trans-Caucasian military district, Lieutenant General Yuriy Grekov, Azerbaijan agrees only to include in the Strategic Forces of the CIS Unified Armed Forces an Air Defense Army, to be deployed on its territory, along with some support units. Everything else, except missile units and a special purpose brigade, should be included in the Azerbaijani Army.²⁰⁷

The President of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov, signed an order that assured rights and social guarantees for servicemen and their families. This act is obviously aimed to encourage officers to pledge loyalty to Azerbaijan.²⁰⁸

The situation has continued to deteriorate because the local government does not fully control the Azerbaijani forces, especially those near the "front-zone." There have been attempts to seize armaments and military property by force. Many of these armed groups and militias are opposed to the government of President Ayaz Mutalibov. On February 24, in Baku, the car of the Commander of the 4th Army, Nikolay Popov, was shot at by an unknown group.²⁰⁹

In January 1992, supporters of President Mutalibov decided to disband the Defense Council and outlaw the so-called volunteer units. But the Peoples Front opposition, which was supported by 80 percent of all Azerbaijani units, branded this plan as high treason and demanded Mutalibov's resignation.²¹⁰

The opposition against President Mutalibov claimed that he didn't really want to create a national Army. It was alleged that Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry was able to organize only one battalion of 150 soldiers since its establishment in the fall of 1991.²¹¹

The Trans-Caucasian military district has refused to transfer weapons and equipment to Azerbaijan. "We came to a clear conclusion—no transfer of weapons and equipment, taking into account the situation in Nagorno Karabakh, until a peaceful solution of the dispute with Armenia. Otherwise, we'll face an escalation of tensions in the region," explained Lieutenant General Yuriy Grekov, the First Deputy Commander of the Trans-Caucasian district. He also hinted that the officers wanted additional guarantees from the authorities: "The officers say that they of course will implement the order on transfer of weapons and equipment, but on the condition that their families and property will be evacuated first."²¹²

In the winter of 1992, Azerbaijani forces suffered severe losses and were defeated at several important positions in Nagorno Karabakh and on the Armenian border. Commonwealth troops were blamed for these defeats because they allegedly supported

Armenian forces. After the fall of the strategically located city of Hojaly and the massacre of the Azerbaijani people there, Ayaz Mutalibov was forced to resign the presidency.

According to Azerbaijani sources, since Mutalibov's resignation, there has been a heated debate among different political factions about military questions. Most of these issues are related to the CIS summit held in Kiev. The Peoples Front adopted a resolution, which rejected Azerbaijan's participation in the Unified General Purpose Forces and demanded that CIS forces in Azerbaijan be treated as "foreign troops." But acting President Yagub Mamedov claimed that, if Azerbaijan abstains, Russian leaders would provide even greater support to Armenia.²¹³

The Minister for National Security, General Ilgusein Pircusein Oglyu Guseinov, said that "the mistake with the time-lag in the creation of the Army actually meant the loss of Karabakh."²¹⁴ He also declared that, upon the creation of a regular Azerbaijani Army, the whole territory of the Nagorno Karabakh would be "freed."

There is still no "real Army" in Azerbaijan. The military forces consist of National Army detachments, special police units (OMON), militiamen, security forces, and volunteers. Isa Gambarov, chairman of the Azerbaijani Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the creation of well-prepared Armed Forces, including Ground Forces, Navy, and a minimal Air Force, is a life and death issue for Azerbaijan. The Deputy Chairman of the Peoples Front, Niyazi Ibragimov, demanded that all fighting units be subordinated to the Central Command in Baku. He suggested that those units that don't implement orders or disarm be put under control or disbanded.²¹⁵ There have been reports, however, that Azerbaijanis are receiving substantial military assistance from 4th Army units.

According to Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Azerbaijan received 50 T-72 tanks, more than 100 AIFVs, dozens of "Grad" MLRSs, and 9 combat helicopters from the 7th Army depot.²¹⁶ Yet, General Dadash Rzaev, Deputy Defense Minister of Azerbaijan, claimed that Armenian forces received 90 percent of all weapons of the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment in Stepanakert.²¹⁷ Armenians also claim that 30 tanks and AIFVs of the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division of the 4th Army participated in the Azerbaijani attack on the town of Askeran.²¹⁸

It was also reported that the Union of Ukrainian officers has offered to help the Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan train its military forces. An international battalion of Russian and other non-Azerbaijani servicemen was formed in Baku.²¹⁹

On March 19, Ragim Gaziev, a leader of the Peoples Front and the military commander of the town of Shusha (the Azerbaijani stronghold in Nagorno Karabakh), was appointed the new Defense Minister of Azerbaijan.²²⁰ In March, the Peoples Front announced that Azerbaijan must militarize its economy and create its own military industrial complex. The district branches of the Peoples Front had to direct mobilization and military training. The national Army is to be manned by conscription. The Peoples Front wanted the Defense Ministry to establish military tribunals and punish discipline cases and saboteurs. The Peoples Front also demanded the establishment of a military censorship system.²²¹

The Azerbaijani military commanders, including the Chief of Staff, consider the refusal by the troops of the Trans-Caucasian military district to obey Azerbaijani orders and to transfer to Azerbaijani control military equipment and weapons to be illegal.

The explosive situation forced the Main Command of the Commonwealth to agree to transfer some General Purpose Forces and Caspian Sea Fleet units to Azerbaijan. Special agreements would be reached with other republics, such as Russia, for training officers in the military academies.

Efforts to produce a cease-fire between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces collapsed. On May 8, in Teheran, after two days of negotiations (which included the participation of the Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani), the President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and the Acting President of Azerbaijan, Yakub Mamedov, signed a cease-fire agreement. But on the next night Armenian forces in Nagorno Karabakh started a massive attack on the town of Shusha (the last town held by Azerbaijanis in Nagorno Karabakh, which controlled the road between Karabakh and Armenia) and, on May 9, captured it.²²²

After the capture of Shusha, Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan said that "the situation got out of control," hinting that the Armenian forces in Nagorno Karabakh, which started the offensive, were outside of his control.²²³ Observers commented:

The fall of Shusha leads to serious domestic political consequences in both republics. The Dashnak party is in power in Nagorno Karabakh, but not in Armenia. In Armenia, it represents the strongest opposition force to Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Therefore, it will probably bring more pressure on the Armenian leaders, trying to weaken their position. The fall of Shusha means a political collapse for Azerbaijan. The situation in Baku has been destabilized and the Presidential elections on June 7 may be postponed. The leader of the Peoples Front, Abulfas Elchibek, who is the principal candidate, received a strong blow.... [Acting President] Yakub Mamedov blamed "certain forces," hinting at the Peoples Front, for betrayal, which resulted in the loss of Shusha.²²⁴

On May 14, the Parliament of Azerbaijan restored Ayaz Mutalibov as President of the republic. Apparently, he masterminded his return to power using the fall of Shusha exactly like the Peoples Front used the fall of Hojaly earlier to force him to resign. He declared that Hojaly and Shusha were lost because Azerbaijan "failed to integrate militarily into the CIS" and proposed to sign a bilateral treaty with Russia, because "we would not have lost Shusha if we were not in confrontation with Russia."²²⁵

Mutalibov demanded to be accorded emergency powers and replaced the Interior Minister. However, he soon faced the overwhelming forces of the Peoples Front, which branded Mutalibov's return as "a Communist coup d'etat."²²⁶ The Peoples Front brought thousands of people to the Parliament building, which, together with other government buildings, was defended by CIS troops (actually, troops belonging to Russia).

The decisive factor in the internal struggle in Baku was the Peoples Front's control of the Azerbaijani Army. Because some troops left the front in Nagorno Karabakh and came to Baku, the Peoples Front was able to take control quickly of the government and depose Ayaz Mutalibov for the second time.²²⁷ According to media reports, the President had to flee from Baku to Moscow in a military airplane.²²⁸

Abulfaz Elchibek, Chairman of the Peoples Front, announced:

All agreements signed by Mutalibov are invalid because they were not ratified by the Parliament. We consider them to be a result of the short-sighted policy of the former President. Azerbaijan will not enter the present CIS. We believe that all treaties—economic, political, military—have to be bilateral and mutually beneficial.... I don't consider the CIS and its member states truly independent.²²⁹

On May 18, Armenian forces and Kurdish militia captured the town of Lachin, establishing a land corridor between Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia. This opened the prospects of an all-out war between Armenia and Azerbaijan with the possible involvement of other powers.

Since Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan signed the Collective Security Treaty in Tashkent, Azerbaijan has believed that the CIS Unified Armed Forces and the Russian Army would support Armenia as their ally.²³⁰

Thus, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan may escalate further. The troops of the former Soviet Armed Forces appear to be less and less under the control of the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces.

The 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment, deployed in the town of Stepanakert (the capital of Nagorno Karabakh), has become the most notorious case of low discipline in the Armed Forces. Officially, the military is neutral in the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, but their very presence in Stepanakert served, to an extent, as a deterrent against Azerbaijani attacks. Some of the officers (especially those of Armenian extraction) became involved in fighting for Armenia. This provoked Azerbaijani reprisals. Marshal Shaposhnikov, however, refused to agree with Azerbaijan's demand to withdraw the regiment.

There has been a high level of desertion in the military due to continued artillery attacks by Azerbaijanis, pro-Armenian activities on the part of some officers and soldiers, and terrible living conditions. The regiment was completely dispirited, which might explain why Marshal Shaposhnikov finally ordered it to withdraw from Stepanakert. The commander of the 366th Regiment, however, failed to organize the march properly, trying to move all battalions at the same time. This is why, in the beginning of March, they were blocked by Armenian forces and the commander of one of the battalions defected with his forces to Armenia.²³¹ Only with the assistance of paratroopers was the 366th Regiment finally able to escape. Nine hundred officers and soldiers with their dependents were moved to Georgia by military helicopters. The regiment, however, left a lot of weapons and equipment to the Armenians: 17 armored fighting vehicles, 4 self-propelled Shilka air

defense systems, some 122-mm guns, and tanks and other vehicles.²³² Some of these weapons were seized by Major Sergey Ogayan, the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 366th Regiment. Ogayan is an ethnic Armenian, who, together with 54 other officers and warrant officers of Armenian origin, deserted to the Armenian militia.

There have been also cases where Soviet officers deserted to Azerbaijan. In February 1992, Major Viktor Mudrak, Commander of a reconnaissance battalion, who is half-Azerbaijanian, managed to disarm his soldiers and transfer six AIFVs, two ACVs, and a lot of ammunition to Azerbaijan. He was given the rank of Colonel and appointed Commander of a spetsnaz battalion in the Azerbaijani Army.²³³

According to military authorities, "nationalistically oriented servicemen are used to providing weapons to militias." For instance, in Baku, Lieutenant Captain Zeinalabdin Aliyev managed to tie up the officer on duty and steal 42 machine guns, 48 guns, and a great deal of ammunition. He brought all of this to Azerbaijani armed groups. In Kutaisi, Senior Sergeant Giya Mukeriya brought 15 Georgian armed gunmen to his base and captured 73 machine guns and 20,000 bullets for them.²³⁴ The Armenians then accused the 4th Army, deployed in Azerbaijan, of transferring huge amounts of weapons to Azerbaijani forces.

On March 8, Armenian militias captured ten officers of an Air Defense missile brigade in the town of Artik (including the commander of the brigade, Colonel V. Reshetnikov).²³⁵ In exchange for their release, the Armenians asked for large quantities of ammunition (5,000 shells for the MLRSS BM-21 "Grad," 5,000 shells for 120-mm mortars, 5,000 shells for the RPG, a 30-mm machine gun for AIFV BMP-2, and 2 million bullets for machine guns).²³⁶ According to Lieutenant Colonel Valentin Kolbasyuk, Deputy Commander of the brigade, Armenian soldiers and warrant officers participated in the kidnapping.²³⁷ The remaining officers were able to repel the Armenian attack and, after strong pressure from the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces and Russian Vice President General Rutskoy, who threatened retaliation by Soviet troops, the hostages were released. The Soviet troops did deploy a spetsnaz platoon and other troops to attack the Armenian militiamen.

Armenia's position on military issues is tightly connected to developments in Azerbaijan. Armenian representatives formally supported the unity of the Commonwealth Armed Forces, but, in fact, Armenian leaders viewed Soviet troops as republican property (as did Azerbaijan). They want to preserve good, neighborly relations with Russia, while preparing for the division of Soviet military equipment and the creation of an Armenian military structure using this equipment.

According to Edward Simonyan, a national security adviser to President Ter-Petrosyan, at the February CIS Minsk summit, the Armenian delegation supported a transition period for the transformation of the Armed Forces.²³⁸ After the CIS summit in Kiev, the President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, stated: "The Commonwealth is today the only system to guarantee security and economic development of Armenia."²³⁹

But on March 18, the Armenian Parliament passed a resolution that prohibited the transfer of 7th Army military equipment or weapons outside the republic and ordered

Defense and Interior Ministries to implement this decision. The Armenian Defense Ministry was ordered to appoint "observers" to all military units.²⁴⁰

The Armenian Defense Ministry announced that "only a standing Army can guarantee the security of the republic." It is reported that a division deployed in Yerevan is scheduled to be transferred to Armenian jurisdiction. About 15 percent of the officers (who were promised salaries of 5 to 10 times higher) of the Yerevan division agreed to take the oath of loyalty to Armenia. Because there are not enough officers, Armenian authorities have asked Armenian officers in the North-Western group (deployed in the Baltic states) to serve in the Armenian Army. Azerbaijani authorities are doing the same.²⁴¹ The Defense Ministry of Armenia also called all military officers of Armenian origin to return to serve in the Armenian Armed Forces.²⁴²

On March 13, Russian Vice President General Rutskoy said that "all Russian soldiers have become hostages of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war." He demanded the immediate withdrawal of the 4th and 7th Armies to Russia.²⁴³ General Rutskoy also demanded the immediate withdrawal of the 4th and 7th Armies from Armenia and Azerbaijan.²⁴⁴ "The withdrawal will take about two weeks," said the Vice President, who called also for removal of all weapons and equipment from the Trans-Caucasian military district and suggested that everything that cannot be removed should be destroyed.²⁴⁵

Chief of the General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, Colonel General Victor Samsonov, said: "We are concerned that the 4th Army in Azerbaijan and the 7th Army in Armenia have become hostages to the political situation, provoking confrontation between the two nations."²⁴⁶ He disclosed that, in February, the Main Command asked Russia to take these Armies under its jurisdiction, because "without this decision we can not begin withdrawal of the troops. Armenia and Azerbaijan have declared the troops on their territory as their property."²⁴⁷ According to General Samsonov, there were 27,000 family members of the officers of those Armies.

At the end of March, Marshal Shaposhnikov said that both the 4th and 7th Armies had to be transferred to Russian jurisdiction, following negotiations with Azerbaijan and Armenia.²⁴⁸ If they refuse to accept Russia's claims, the two Armies should be withdrawn to Russia. Marshal Shaposhnikov also stated: "I wish the Council of Heads of States decided not to create national armies in states that participate in military conflicts. But unfortunately, heads of states don't go for that."²⁴⁹

Lately, Armenia and even Georgia expressed agreement that the Trans-Caucasian military district should be placed under the jurisdiction of Russia as principal successor of Soviet Union. Such a solution can provide Armenia with confidence that the conflict, or rather the war with neighboring Azerbaijan, would somehow be controlled. But, perhaps this is the reason why Azerbaijan, which is in the same military district, strongly objects to the idea. In April 1992, Russia placed the forces of the Trans-Caucasian military district under its jurisdiction. In May, Russia announced that, in two years, it will withdraw its troops from Armenia and Azerbaijan. A few of its forces will remain in Georgia.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has also involved military personnel from other republics. These republics are now demanding the immediate withdrawal of their people. For instance, in March 1992, there were 4,607 conscripts from Ukraine in the Trans-

Caucasian military district. On February 19, 1992, the Main Command of the CIS Unified Forces ordered those conscripts transferred to Ukraine until May 1.²⁵⁰ Belarus and a few other republics have done the same.

There is a strong fear of further escalation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, which would mean a protracted and prolonged civil war and military conflict that could evolve into a regional conflict with an international dimension.

MOLDOVA

Another military conflict has developed within the Commonwealth in Moldova. While Moldova is a CIS member, it did not sign most of the Commonwealth documents concerning military issues (including the agreement on General Purpose Forces). The Moldovan government has based its policy for forming a national Army on the same policy that has proved so effective in Ukraine. Moldova is playing on the officers' unclear future and their vague prospects for social guarantees from the motherland, Russia, or other republics. In January, the Moldovan Parliament issued a law on social and legal defense for military men. According to this law, those who assume Moldovan citizenship enjoy a number of guarantees and privileges.

According to the declaration of President Mircho Snegur, the future army of Moldova will consist of 20,000 professionals (other sources give a figure of 14,000 to 15,000). The forces of the former Soviet Union should be withdrawn in one year's time. (This particular condition poses a big problem for the Commonwealth.)

The Republican Army will consist of a ground forces brigade, an air defense brigade, an air fire support brigade, and some rear units. According to these calculations, there are almost 3,000 Moldovan officers now serving in the former Soviet Army. These officers will constitute the bulk of the new Republican Army. The material base would be provided by the 14th Army, which is located on the left bank of the Dniester River. As in the case of Azerbaijan, the new Army may be used to force republic unification. Even local high-ranking officials do not exclude such a possibility.

The 14th Army, deployed in Moldova, was removed from the control of the Odessa military district (which was earlier transferred to Ukrainian control) and has remained under the control of the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces.²⁵¹ The 14th Army has become involved in the conflict between the Moldovan government and the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester republic. The Trans-Dniester authorities, relying on the support of the Russian and Ukrainian majority on the left bank of the Dniester River, have accused the Moldovan government of intentions to join Romania.

The secessionist leaders originally counted on assistance from the Soviet Defense Ministry under Marshal Yazov, but since the failure of the August coup d'etat, found this support waning. Lieutenant General Gennadiy Yakovlev, the Commander of the 14th Army, continued to support the rebels. On December 5, 1991, he was appointed director of the Republican Department for Defense and Security by the President of the Trans-Dniester Republic, Igor Smirnov.²⁵² But later, General Yakovlev was dismissed from this position as Commander of the 14th Army.

Because the secessionists were facing greater Moldovan forces, which were attempting to restore Kishinev government authority on the Dniester's left bank, they tried to provoke the 14th Army by attempting to get the Army more directly involved in the conflict against the Moldovans. The Supreme Soviet of the Trans-Dniester republic appealed to the 14th Army "to provide assistance to defend the republic" and to "contain the confrontation with Moldova."²⁵³

When the Moldovan forces tried, in early March 1992, to cross the Dniester and capture opposition strongholds, they occupied some of the Armed Forces positions, including a civil defense regiment garrison. Some Army officers were taken hostages. Following stern warnings against interference from Marshal Shaposhnikov, the 14th Army did not retaliate against the Moldovans.

This provoked an angry reaction from secessionists. A women's group organized a siege of 14th Army Headquarters and demanded weapons. The commander of the 14th Army, Major General Yury Netkachev, had to announce that the ammunition depots were protected by minefields in order to prevent their capture.²⁵⁴ Nevertheless, on March 14, one of the depots was overrun and 1,307 machine guns, 255 guns, and half a million bullets were captured by secessionist forces.²⁵⁵

A more bizarre episode took place on March 8, when four bodyguards of the self-proclaimed President of the Trans-Dniester republic kidnapped Colonel Yuriy Stepygin, chief of counterintelligence of the 14th Army. In response, the counterintelligence officers kidnapped the chief of the president's personal security unit. The next day the hostages were exchanged.²⁵⁶

The leader of the Women's Strike Committee (this group regularly leads women and children on assaults against military installations), Galina Andreyeva, announced that General Netkachev and Colonel Stepygin were sentenced to hang because of the Army's refusal to help the Dniester republic.²⁵⁷

Later, an unknown group captured the former Commander of the 14th Army, Lieutenant General Gennadiy Yakovlev, who had supported the National Guard of the Dniester republic before he was replaced by Marshal Shaposhnikov for his pro-secessionist activities. The Moldovan authorities denied responsibility for Yakovlev's kidnapping. On March 20, however, he, together with 4 imprisoned National guardsmen from the Dniester republic, were exchanged for 27 Moldovan policemen, who were arrested earlier by the secessionists.²⁵⁸

In a statement released on March 17, 1992, the 14th Army Assembly of Officers and Warrant Officers announced that, if the threat of war becomes a reality, the Army wouldn't remain neutral and would defend itself and its dependents with arms. They noted that Army neutrality had not prevented an escalation of military activities in the Trans-Caucasian region. This is why they were not going to assist the transformation of the lands near the Dniester River into "a Moldovan Karabakh."²⁵⁹

The situation is aggravated by the involvement of Cossack volunteers from Russia, who take a most active part in military operations. On March 14, 600 Cossacks and

National Guardsmen of the Dniester republic used heavy trucks to break into a military base near Tiraspol. They captured large quantities of weapons and military equipment.²⁶⁰

The Moldovan President, Mircha Snegur, stated that, because the Cossacks participate in the Dniester region conflict and the Russian government doesn't respond to his protests, Moldova, as a UN member, is entitled to ask for international help, which would include assistance from Romania.²⁶¹ According to President Snegur, Yeltsin, in a telephone conversation, promised to take all necessary measures to withdraw the Cossack units and ensure noninterference in the internal affairs of Moldova.²⁶²

On March 21, the Russian Parliament called all sides in the Moldova conflict to participate in a cease-fire. It also wants the Dniester region to receive special economic status (as promised by the Moldovan government) and the right to self-determination, if Moldova gives up its independence.²⁶³

According to reports, on March 2, 1992, pro-Moldovan groups captured some radioactive materiels at the base of a civil defense regiment located at Kochary on the right bank of the Dniester River. Later, the materials were returned to the military base, but on March 18, they were again taken by another paramilitary group.²⁶⁴

The conflict has produced numerous casualties and refugees. On March 17, Ukrainian President Kravchuk announced that the Ukrainian State Committee for Border Protection, the Internal Affairs Ministry, the National Guard, the Security Service, and the Custom service of Ukraine were ordered to ensure the safety and integrity of the Ukrainian border with Moldova. In addition, these groups are to prevent violations of Ukrainian territory by armed groups. This order establishes a special 50-kilometer zone near the border between Moldova and Ukraine.²⁶⁵

After the CIS Kiev summit in March, Marshal Shaposhnikov announced that the 14th Army in Moldova was to be divided. The forces on the left bank, in the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester republic, will be included in the CIS Unified Armed Forces. The forces on the right bank would mostly be transferred to the control of Moldova.²⁶⁶

At the height of the military conflict with the secessionists, the Moldovan parliament unanimously passed a legislative package, including laws "On Defense," "On Armed Forces," "On military conscription of citizens of Moldova," and "On social and judicial protection of the citizens, who serve in the Armed Forces, and members of their families."²⁶⁷ At the end of March, President Snegur proclaimed a State of Emergency and announced his determination to preserve the unity of Moldova.

At the height of the conflict, Moldova nationalized all military forces on its territory. Many officers, however, refused to take an oath of loyalty to Moldova and were given two months to leave their positions.

Meanwhile, the President of the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester republic, Igor Smirnov, at a meeting with officers of the 14th Army, announced that the Trans-Dniester republic would have its own army, consisting of 12,000 troops. He invited 2,500 officers of the 14th Army to join his troops by signing contracts that would guarantee them social protection and pensions.²⁶⁸

In May 1992, mediating efforts failed and the fighting resumed. President Snegur refused to participate at the CIS summit in Tashkent, complaining about Russian "interference" in domestic affairs of Moldova. According to Snegur, Russia "displays undue interest" in the issue of the Trans-Dniester region and, took "a unilateral decision to transfer the 14th Army to Russian jurisdiction." The presence of the 14th Army in Moldova was called "a destabilizing factor."²⁶⁹ Snegur demanded that Russia immediately withdraw the 14th Army.²⁷⁰

On May 19, after 20 people died during an artillery attack by Moldovan forces on one of the Army bases, 10 tanks, 10 AFVs, and 3 guns joined the fighting with Moldovans on the side of the Trans-Dniester republic. The Government of Moldova interpreted this action as "a Russian aggression." The Commander of the 14th Army, Lieutenant General Yuriy Netkachev, alleged that the armored vehicles were captured by local reservists and that the military didn't participate in the hostilities.²⁷¹

Thus, like in Nagorno Karabakh, the conflict in Moldova could reach the level of an all-out war with outside involvement.

MILITARY POLICIES OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH: SLOW BUT STEADY

BELARUS

Other former Soviet republics were rather slow to develop their own military policies. For some time, they were ready to accept single [undivided] Armed Forces under the control of Marshal Shaposhnikov. But, in the spring of 1992, the republics took the first steps toward creating their own national defense structures.

Belarus (formerly Belorussia), which was a founding member of the Commonwealth with Russia and Ukraine, for the most part positioned itself between its two larger "sister republics." The nationalist movement in Belarus was much weaker than in Ukraine. Therefore, the old bureaucracy was able to remain in power. Nevertheless, it found itself under growing pressure from nationalist groups.

Soon after the CIS summit in Alma-Ata, in December 1991, Lieutenant General Petr Chaus was appointed Defense Minister of Belarus. General Chaus disclosed that there were 180,000 troops on the territory of the republic. Approximately half of them were responsible not to the Command of the Belarusian military district, but to the General Staff in Moscow. He also announced that the future "Armed Forces of Belarus have to be small in number, highly mobile, and ready." They would consist of "border troops to protect the republic's frontiers and ground forces, which can immediately react to emergencies." He claimed that the forces of the Belarusian military district had to be reduced drastically: "There are so many troops in Belarus that the republic cannot sustain them. These forces have to be reduced to reasonable limits, but it cannot be done quickly because of the fate of thousands of officers and warrant-officers."²⁷²

General Chaus also said that the Belarusian government decided to create its Defense Ministry on the basis of the Staff of the Belarusian military district. According to General Chaus, the Armed Forces of Belarus would have about 90,000 men.²⁷³ In his estimate, the process of creating a National Army would take two stages. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, Stanislav Shushkevich, said the process of creating the Belarusian Armed Forces would take two years.²⁷⁴

But, in January 1992, the Supreme Soviet of Belarus decided to place the military forces, deployed in the republic, under the Belarusian jurisdiction. The Prime Minister of Belarus, Vyacheslav Kebich, then said: "The republic should have its own Army and all property of the Belarusian military district, except the Strategic Forces, should belong to Belarus." Belarus also prohibited the transfer of the Vitebsk Airborne Division to the Chechen republic, when Russia threatened to use force against this republic's secessionist government.

On March 17, 1992, following an initiative by the Union of Belarusian soldiers, an Anticrisis Committee was established in Belarus. This step reflected a growing concern about Russia's possible intervention into the affairs of the republic.

The Committee was headed by Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich and the chairman of the Union of Belarusian Soldiers, Nikolay Statkevich. The official purpose of the

Anti-crisis Committee was to prevent a threat to the sovereignty of Belarus, including "violent processes and activities on the territory of Belarus, taking into account a lack of full-fledged state institutions for defense and the protection of sovereignty." The Belarusian politicians signed an agreement "On Joint Actions in the Event of a Threat to the Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus," which was signed by the representatives of all of the political parties and major governmental offices. The agreement defined the threat as "a real danger of actions or actions themselves from the territories of neighboring states against the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus, its constitutionally elected bodies of state power; interference into the internal affairs of the republic or pressure from neighboring states against the constitutionally elected bodies of state power or territorial integrity; a direct aggression or its threat from other states or their Armed Forces; and any other danger to the Republic of Belarus, as defined by participants to this agreement.²⁷⁵

The Command of the Belarusian military district did not sign the agreement. "The lack of guarantees necessary for the Belarusian military district to defend the republic makes the situation unpredictable," said the chairman of the Belarusian social-democratic party, M. Tkachev.²⁷⁶

In Belarus, there was no shortage of officers for organizing a National Army (unlike in most other Soviet republics). It was announced at the meeting of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Belarusian Soldiers that 39,000 officers of Belarusian origin based outside Belarus are ready to fight in the event of Russian aggression against Belarus. "There is a great probability of a civil war in Russia and there is an outside threat to Belarus. It's a speculation, but even with a five percent chance of such events, we, the military, must defend Belarus," declared Chairman of the Union, Nikolay Stakevich. "They will have a civil war throughout Russia," said another participant.²⁷⁷

There are 1,500 officers in Belarus outside the organic structure of military district units. Meanwhile, almost 2,500 officers and warrant-officers of Belarusian origin, serving in other military districts, asked for a transfer to Belarus. However, only 82 of those officers have housing in Belarus. At the same time, 62 officers have asked to be transferred from Belarus.

In March 1992, the Belarusian Parliament decided to withdraw its conscripts (about 2,000 men) from the Trans-Caucasian military district and Moldova.²⁷⁸

On March 19, Belarus announced that it had begun to form its own Armed Forces.²⁷⁹ The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Belarusian Parliament, Leonid Privalov, said that the Armed Forces of Belarus will consist of all Ground Forces, the Vitebsk Airborne Division, Air Defense, and Tactical Aviation on the territory of the republic. The Strategic Forces will include nuclear weapons, bombers, and the aircraft and radar units, which belong to the Baltic Fleet.²⁸⁰ The Chairman of the Parliamentarian Committee on National Security and Defense, Myacheslav Grib, announced that the Belarusian Army will have 90,000 to 100,000 men, the Air Force—12,000 men, and the Air Defense—18,000 men.²⁸¹

Grib denied that Belarus will participate in the Agreement on the Unified General Purpose Forces. In an interview with *Red Star*, he said:

We consider this agreement to be poorly prepared and that it needs additional work. First, we have to define the composition of the General Purpose Forces. This is especially important for Belarus because Strategic Forces, as well as General Purpose [will be included] in the General Purposes Forces. We are told that the remaining forces can be included in the National Armed Forces. What is left—civil defense, regional military conscription offices, military departments at colleges? The agreement has to be redrafted.²⁸²

Although the Belarusian Parliament established the defense Ministry in January 1992, for three months there was a serious struggle concerning the choice for the position of Defense Minister. The commander of the Belarusian military district, Colonel General Anatoliy Kostenko, was criticized for his involvement in the failed coup d'etat in August 1991.²⁸³ Acting Defense Minister Lieutenant General Petr Chaus was too loyal to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Stanislav Shushkevich, who faced serious domestic opposition. Shushkevich wanted to appoint the Chief of Staff of the Turkestan military district, General Shpak, but the opposition rejected the nomination. Finally, a compromise was reached with Lieutenant General Pavel Kozlovskiy, the Chief of Staff of the Belarusian military district.²⁸⁴

General Kozlovskiy presented his plan, which envisages the creation of an Armed Forces of 90,000 troops, including 22,000 officers. The Belarusian Armed Forces would consist of 40,000 Ground Force troops (mostly paratroopers and other mobile units), and a combined Air Force and Air Defense of 22,000.²⁸⁵ Later, Belarus may reduce its Armed Forces to between 60,000 and 70,000.

On May 6, 1992, the government of Belarus abolished the Belarusian military district and subordinated all of its units to the republic's Defense Ministry. The commander of the Belarusian military district, Colonel General Anatoliy Kostenko, was appointed the first Deputy Defense Minister of Belarus.²⁸⁶

Belarus was the only republic that reached an agreement with the Main Command, in which the units to be included in the Strategic Forces as well as the troops to be included in the Belarusian Armed Forces were defined.

At the Tashkent summit in May 1992, Belarus objected to the adoption of a conjugated budget for the Unified Armed Forces, suggesting instead to determine separately the appropriations for the Strategic Forces and the Main Command. As the Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy said, Belarus didn't agree to compensate Russia for expenditures on Strategic Forces, suggesting instead that Russia may be required to compensate Belarus. Kozlovskiy alleged that Belarus "in the past months had spent a lot on Strategic Forces on its territory," providing those troops with fuel, electric energy, and land for their activities.²⁸⁷

The General Staff of the CIS Unified Forces suggested that Belarus should allocate, in 1992, 15,750 million rubles for the Strategic Forces and 14,321 million rubles for the Unified General Purpose Forces. Belarusians claim that it would be much cheaper for them to maintain these forces on their territory.²⁸⁸ Preliminary estimates show that the cost of a Belarusian Armed Forces would be 17 billion rubles, but may cost as much as 20 to 28 billion rubles.²⁸⁹ In 1992, the republic can spend only 8 billion rubles on defense.²⁹⁰

Belarus asked for its share of the \$400 million allocated by the U.S. for destruction of Soviet nuclear weapons. According to Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko, the money is needed for the social rehabilitation of 10,000 to 15,000 officers of the Strategic Missile Forces and their families, who may choose to remain in Belarus.²⁹¹

Belarus also raised the issue of pensions for military retirees, saying that it cannot accept responsibility for 90,000 retired officers now living in Belarus. General Kozlovskiy proposed that military pensions should be paid by those republics in which the officers ended their military service.²⁹²

According to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, Stanislav Shushkevich, his republic cannot join the Collective Security Treaty because of the principle of neutrality stated in the Belarus Declaration of Sovereignty.²⁹³ It is possible to conclude, therefore, that Belarus is following Ukraine by developing its own military posture. Belarus, however, has agreed to limited cooperation with Russia in defense matters under the umbrella of the CIS Unified Armed Forces.

KAZAKHSTAN

Originally, Kazakhstan did not want to create its own army. President Nursultan Nazarbayev supported retention of the Unified Armed Forces, "even if they are organized only by Russia and Kazakhstan."²⁹⁴ During the summit in Minsk, in February 1992, Lieutenant General Sagadat Nurmagambetov, Chairman of the Kazakhstan State Committee for Defense, said: "Kazakhstan stands for a single [centralized] Armed Forces, for a single system of support and maintenance, for a single military education system, and for a territorial manning of the army and an extraterritorial manning for the Strategic Forces."²⁹⁵

One of the problems that Kazakhstan and other Muslim republics have had to face is a lack of officers for the creation of an army. At the same time, most of the draftees of Kazakh origin were serving in construction units, doing hard manual labor because of their poor knowledge of Russian.

On February 23, the soldiers in the construction troops at the Baikonur space launch center started a mass riot, which continued for several days.²⁹⁶ They complained about their living conditions and demanded to be transferred to other bases. The riot was provoked by the arrest of one Kazakh soldier by the military police. About 1,500 unarmed soldiers on trucks attacked the town of Leninsk and the railway station at Tyuratam. Three people were killed in a fire at one of the barracks. In the end, the authorities agreed to let the soldiers return home "on leave."²⁹⁷

For three months, the construction troops had been receiving no pay because the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces failed to provide the money (612 million rubles). Meanwhile, the Kazakhstan government, which claims jurisdiction over the space launch center, provided only 50 million rubles. According to Major General B. Kalinichev, 1 billion rubles is needed to continue the normal functioning of the Baikonur center.²⁹⁸

On March 16, President Nazarbayev signed a decree establishing a Republican Guard. This Armed Force is supposed to defend the sovereignty of the republic, the constitutional rights and freedoms of its citizens, and the republic's other vital interests. The Republican Guard is under the command of the President of Kazakhstan and consists of volunteers. The Republican Guard is not integrated into the CIS Unified Armed Forces, but is meant to serve as its reserve.²⁹⁹

Later, President Nazarbayev placed the 40th Army under the jurisdiction of Kazakhstan. This Army is currently deployed on the territory of the republic. The Commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Anatoliy Ryabzev, complained that he did not understand the lines of subordination: "I receive orders from Tashkent to remove large quantities of military equipment from the territory of Kazakhstan. However, I can't do so without the permission of the President and the government of Kazakhstan because I must obey the laws of the state where the Army is deployed."³⁰⁰

When Russia decided to create its own Armed Forces, taking under its control all troops that had not been nationalized by other republics, Kazakhstan had no choice but to organize its own National Army. On May 7, President Nazarbayev announced that the State Committee for Defense would be reorganized into the Defense Ministry of Kazakhstan. Its purpose is to ensure "defense and territorial integrity, to develop and implement military policy, to provide for the legal regulation of military activities, and to protect the social and economic rights of military personnel." On May 11, Nazarbayev signed a decree creating the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan. All military units and facilities of the Unified Armed Forces on the territory of Kazakhstan are transferred to the Armed Forces of this republic.³⁰¹ Nazarbayev appointed Sagadat Nurmagambetov, a Second World War veteran, to be Defense Minister of Kazakhstan.³⁰²

At the CIS summit in Tashkent, in May 1992, President Nazarbayev agreed to join Russia and four smaller republics in a common defense treaty. Nazarbayev also declared that the Armed Forces of one Commonwealth state shouldn't be used against another.³⁰³

Immediately after the summit, Nazarbayev published the "Strategy for the Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State," which also includes a military doctrine. According to this paper, the goals of Kazakhstan include achieving nonnuclear status, the inviolability of existing boundaries, and non-interference in domestic affairs. The Armed Forces of Kazakhstan have to be organized quickly and will consist of Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Air Defense, and the Navy.³⁰⁴

UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan, which wants to play the leading role in Central Asia, was the first among these republics to organize its National Guard and place Soviet troops on its territory under

republic jurisdiction. Rustam Agayev, the Uzbek Defense Minister and Commander of the National Guard, announced, on February 24, that the troops on the territory of Uzbekistan are under the jurisdiction of the republic. Soldiers and officers, however, were not requested to take the oath of allegiance to Uzbekistan.³⁰⁵

Soon after this announcement, the Parliament of Uzbekistan expressed its concern about the "life and security of soldiers who serve in these regions, where efforts are occurring to involve military units in ethnic conflicts. The Parliament also identified those republics that have announced the formation of their own Armed Forces and are trying to nationalize and "privatize" not only weapons but also manpower by forcing soldiers to take an oath of allegiance." Acting on its concerns, the Uzbekistan Parliament decided to withdraw its soldiers from the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Trans-Caucasian military district. Uzbeki soldiers can continue their service there based on contracts. They can also serve in the Turkestan military district, or the National Guard, internal troops, and security service of Uzbekistan.³⁰⁶

Uzbekistan also decided to establish its own Army after Yeltsin created the Armed Forces of Russia. According to the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan will consist of 25,000 to 30,000 troops and will remain under the control of the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces.³⁰⁷ During the summit in Tashkent, Karimov admitted that "the situation around his republic and events in Afghanistan and Tadzhikistan requires a closer relationship with Russia."³⁰⁸ Earlier he suggested "to conclude a regional mutual security treaty," saying that "Russia can guarantee stability in the region through such a treaty with the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan."³⁰⁹

TURKMENISTAN

In the beginning, Turkmenistan also did not plan to form its own Army. One reason was the almost total lack (like in Tadzhikistan) of officers of Turkmen origin. Its authorities, however, protested that the proposed share for the republic contribution to the budget of the CIS Unified Armed Forces was too high.

But Turkmenistan President Saparmurad Niyazov has made it clear that his republic does not differentiate between the Commonwealth and Russia. "Russia is a great power and obviously plays a priority role in the CIS. It makes no difference for Turkmenistan whether it deals with the Military Command of the CIS or of Russia." President Niyazov admitted that he has an agreement with President Yeltsin on common defense: "We shall jointly maintain the Army, guaranteeing social protection of the military and pensions for the officers. We cannot wait until the Commonwealth arrives at a consensus."³¹⁰

In January 1992, former Chief of the KGB Danatar Kopekov was appointed Defense Minister of Turkmenistan. At a meeting with the commanders of the military units deployed in Turkmenistan, President Saparmurad Niyazov explained that the Defense Minister would coordinate all military activities occurring on the territory of the republic. Later, Kopekov said that Turkmenistan sought a defense treaty with its neighboring republics (including Azerbaijan) and Russia, which would sufficiently prevent armed conflicts over territorial disputes with Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

In February 1992, Turkmenistan announced that its conscripts could continue their service at home. In March, a few soldiers who had refused to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine returned to Turkmenistan. In January 1992, President of Tadzhikistan Rahmon Nabiiev appointed the republic's former Chief of Staff for Civil Defense, Major General Farruh Niyazov, Chairman of the National Defense Committee. Later, Major General Bahram Rahmonov became State Adviser to the President on Defense Matters and the Commander of Tadzhikistan's National Guard.

TADZHIKISTAN

In Tadzhikistan, President Niyazov established a National Guard, but it proved disloyal when, in April 1992, the religious opposition started a revolt against his government. President Niyazov also failed to gain the support of the Commonwealth troops in Tadzhikistan.

During clashes between loyalists to the President and opposition forces in Tadzhikistan's capital, Dushanbe, a CIS tank division remained neutral despite the murder of its division's deputy commander, Lieutenant Colonel Georgiy Dyadyk.³¹¹ During an attack on the premises of the Committee for National Security (formerly the KGB), however, the division's Officers Assembly decided to intervene in order to disengage the antagonistic forces. The division commander sent five tanks, three BMPs, and one BTR to the area and informed Mayor General Bahram Rahmonov, the State Adviser on Defense Matters and Commander of the disloyal National Guard, of this decision. As a result, the opposition forces retreated.³¹²

The opposition originally protested against this intervention, but later the opposing side participated in negotiations held at a CIS base and achieved a compromise. General Rahmonov, who was appointed Defense Minister of Tadzhikistan, has announced that there are about 20,000 Commonwealth troops on the territory of Tadzhikistan. The Armed Forces of the republic will probably have this same number of troops. Rahmonov also said that Tadzhikistanian servicemen will be encouraged to continue their service in the Army of Tadzhikistan.³¹³

KYRGIZSTAN

Kyrgizstan is the only former Soviet republic that has not created its own army. "We stand for a neutral Kyrgyzia and don't intend to enter any military blocks, to create our own Army, to take military units on our territory under our jurisdiction, or to privatize their property," announced the President of Kyrgyzia, Askar Akayev.³¹⁴ Akayev has a reputation as a liberal and democrat close to the Russian leadership.

Despite Kyrgizstan's proclamation of neutrality, the republic signed a treaty with Russia, in February 1992, which provides for defense cooperation. Kyrgizstan has decided that it is able to finance only internal troops, civil defense, and a National Guard. The annual budget of the National Guard will be 60 million rubles, which is claimed to be two times less than the expenditures for the National Guards of Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. Major General Janibek Umetaliyev was appointed Chairman of the State Committee for Defense for the Republic of Kyrgizstan.

But even in Kyrgyzstan a conflict occurred between the military and local authorities. Twelve L-39 air trainers, which flew from Kyrgyzstan to Russia over Kazakhstan, became the focus of a political scandal in Kyrgyzia. Its parliament decided to remove the commander of the training unit, General V. Belezkiy, and to prevent any other transfer of military systems from the Kyrgyzstan without parliamentary permission. The airfields were surrounded with special police detachments (OMON). Marshal Shaposhnikov had to promise to return the aircraft to Kyrgyzstan.³¹⁵

THE BALTICS

Because of their forced annexation during WW II, the three Baltic republics are now considered fully independent states and are recognized by the international community. As of now, they do not participate in any Commonwealth consultations on military problems, but questions concerning the remaining military legacy should and are being decided.

The North-West group of forces was organized in late autumn and has replaced the old Baltic military district. The commanders of this group are now engaged in consultations on the withdrawal of forces from this region. The withdrawal is already under way. The first military troops started to leave Lithuania in January and Latvia in March 1992. The terms of the withdrawal have not yet been discussed with the Estonian leadership because of the government crisis there. Some withdrawals, however, have been undertaken in November of last year. According to the Ministry of Defense, the problem of withdrawal can be decided only on the basis of consultations.

The Estonian national Army is now being organized. The number of troops at the initial stages will number about 1,800 border guards. A police brigade and rescue service will also be organized. A preliminary agreement was reached with the center that states that some military equipment will be transferred to the republic, but only after the withdrawal of the troops. Yet, the consultations on this question are ongoing. The local parliament has declared that all military equipment on its territory is national property, but the military authority of the North-West group is trying to withdraw this equipment clandestinely. This attempt has caused a great deal of trouble and is considered unlawful.

The special military organization "Kaitseliit" has been restored in Estonia. Its aim is to supervise the activity of the union troops and to prevent the withdrawal of military equipment. The government has organized its own armed troops and plans to unite both military formations. Defensive forces headquarters is prepared to provide armaments and munitions.³¹⁶

In Lithuania, a rapid response brigade is being created. The government's position is to prevent the issue of the union troop withdrawal from becoming political. But, having noted this, President Landsbergis has declared discontent with the rate of the withdrawal. According to his data at the end of March, little more than one hundred servicemen have left the republic. Currently, units 60,000 to 80,000 strong are still deployed on Lithuanian territory.³¹⁷

In Latvia, the training of national border guards has started. The representatives of the republican Ministry of Defense consider these detachments to be the basis of the future republican defensive forces. Their strength is planned to reach 5,000 to 7,000 personnel

by autumn 1992.³¹⁸ The Parliament has unilaterally declared the transition of all military equipment to the republican jurisdiction. Parliament is also discussing the concept of defense and security, which proposes the creation of a defense force numbering 50,000 to 60,000.

The communiq s signed by the representatives of Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia in February of this year have much in common, but there are differences as well. For instance, Russia approved Latvia's right to military property, but only property that belonged to the republic before its annex in 1940. Latvian authorities, however, are undertaking unilateral steps for control of this property. The commander of the North-West group, General Valeriy Mironov, considers this a dangerous development.

The final date for the last union soldier to leave the Baltic has not been mentioned. This has been done deliberately, General Valeriy Mironov explains, because the Army does not want to experience the same social problems faced by Soviet forces when they withdrew from Eastern Europe. At the same time, he accuses the republican Parliaments of adopting acts that infringe upon the social interests of the servicemen.

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RUSSIA: IN SEARCH OF A NEW IDENTITY

Because the other former Soviet republics are creating their own armies, Russia had to create its own military establishment. The division of the USSR Armed Forces has made the formation of the Russian Army unavoidable (even if Russia chooses to transfer its forces to the Main Command of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Unified Armed Forces).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become the main successor to the former superpower. For example, it received the Soviet Union's seat in the UN Security Council. This does not, however, involve just a change in name. Russia may not simply continue the security policies of its predecessor.

While continuing in the place of the Soviet Union and its predecessor, the Russian empire, the new Russian state differs from them both politically (striving to be a democracy), economically (transitioning to a free market system), and geographically (Russia has never had its present boundaries). The new Russia has yet to determine its identity, its character, its national interests, and its place in the world.

Another factor is the fundamental difference in the international system from the bipolar system that existed for 45 years. In a multipolar world, with such centers of power as the United States, Western Europe, Japan, China, and India, Russia can be at best only a major player; it cannot be a superpower.

The reborn Russian state is already facing its first crisis in foreign affairs. The agreements by 11 former Soviet republics to establish the CIS may soon become just pieces of paper. Russia may become involved in a confrontation with the Ukraine and other members of the CIS.

The situation is complicated by the tremendous economic difficulties and growing social tensions. Internally, Russia faces the real threats of fragmentation and dismemberment, which indicate its urgent need for its own national security policy. Russia still lacks the mechanism for decision-making in foreign and security policy.

Army General Konstantin Kobets, former State Adviser on Defense Matters to the Russian Government and a strong proponent for the formation of Russian Armed Forces, said: "Russia has its own state interests and it will defend them with force or its possible use."³¹⁹

The national security interests of Russia are defined by three concentric circles. Russia's first priority should be its relations with the former Soviet republics. The greatest threat to Russia now comes from possible territorial and ethnic conflicts with these newly independent states. It is vital for Russia to avoid such rivalries and establish friendly relations and, if possible, even alliances with states where millions of ethnic Russians live.

The second circle of Russian security interests lies with Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East—regions that traditionally were of strategic importance to the Soviet Union. With the exception of the Far East, Russia is now separated from those regions by newly independent states. However, it cannot ignore the economic and geopolitical

developments in these regions. Some of the former Soviet Republics can now be included in the spheres of interest of such regional powers as China or Japan. Conflicts in these regions could force Russian involvement. Russia's hold over Siberia may be jeopardized, if it is forced to compete with its great neighbors—China or Japan.

The third circle includes Russian relations with the West, especially with the United States and Western Europe. With even more radical cuts in strategic nuclear arms than envisaged by the START (up to 75 to 80 percent of the present levels), Russia will retain the means for mutually assured destruction, which will endow the Russian-American relationship with a special character—one that might move from a regulated rivalry to a limited partnership.

Moreover, with Russia's involvement in Europe and the North Atlantic, integration can play a decisive role in the future of Russia's democratic institutions and market economy. If Russia is not integrated with Europe, its economic progress will be doubtful and it may become more Asian in nature.

Will Russia possess vital security interests globally in addition to those defined by the three circles? It is doubtful that events in South America or Africa will have a direct impact on Russia. The main threat to Russia's security today originates from internal, not external factors. Russia, in the future, may encounter foreign threats, but for the time being its security will be challenged by explosive domestic problems.

This doesn't mean that Russia can and should unilaterally disarm. Military power remains an important national security factor. There is, however, little need to continue the arms race, in which the Soviet Union single-handedly opposed the rest of the world. Internationally, Russia does not need to compete with major centers of power like the United States, Western Europe, China, and Japan. It needs them as reliable partners and allies.

The policy of the Russian government has received serious criticism from high ranking military officers. For instance, Major General Nikolay Stolyarov, assistant for personnel to the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, warned, in the newspaper *Red Star*, that Russia can disintegrate just as the Soviet Union did: "The present Russian Troika—the President, the Vice President, and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet—may not repeat the mistake of Gorbachev in dealing with Russia. They [the Troika] may be accused by their own people of being responsible for the dissolution of the Soviet Union."³²⁰

The military also complained that the process of dividing the Soviet Armed Forces among the former republics may be requested by some of the Russian autonomous republics who wish to establish their own military formations. The first to do so was the Chechen republic, headed by a former Air Force General Djohae, who led the secession from Russia. The Armed Forces in the Chechen republic include more than a dozen other militias now under the control of other local tribal chiefs. These forces exist in addition to those loyal to General Djohae.³²¹

In March 1992, at the VIth Conference of the mountain nations of the Caucuses Confederation, the Confederation decided to create its own Armed Forces. (This Confederation represents a number of Russian autonomous republics and districts.)

According to Colonel (Ret.) Husen Kashirgov, these forces will defend the sovereignty of the Confederation, perform peacekeeping missions, and protect civil rights. The Armed Forces of the Confederation will include motorized rifle, tank, artillery, Air Force, and Air Defense units and will be manned by conscripts and volunteers serving on contract.³²²

One of the proposals worked out during these meetings was the creation of a Union of Caucasian states, consisting of the Caucasian states, the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories, Volgograd, and the Rostov provinces of Russia. The creation of such an entity is relatively unrealistic and would cause serious military instability in the southern outskirts of Russia. General Djohae and his ally, the deposed President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsahurdia, supported the idea.

On the other hand, the Temporary Military Council of Abkhazia (an autonomous republic in Georgia, which wants to secede to Russia) has created a regiment of internal troops from a battalion of former USSR internal troops. This regiment is manned mostly by ethnic Abkhazians and a few Georgians. The chairman of the Temporary Military Council, Vladislav Adzinba, announced that all property of the former Soviet military forces in Abkhazia belongs to the Government of Abkhazia.³²³

The conditions in the Northern Caucuses deteriorated so much that the troops had to be withdrawn from some areas. According to sources in the Ground Forces Command, three divisions based in the Northern Caucuses (Vladikavkaz, Grozny, Buynaksk) will be redeployed to Russia.³²⁴

The Bashkortostan Supreme Soviet (an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation) decided that some of the conscripts from this republic should remain as internal troops, civil defense forces, and military construction units. The draftees from Bashkortostan can serve outside of the republic only if they volunteer to do so.³²⁵

The threat of further disintegration, as demonstrated by the recent Tartar autonomous republic's declaration of sovereignty, has brought growing pressure on President Boris Yeltsin to establish the Armed Forces of Russia. For obvious reasons, this idea was resisted by the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, who fear that Russia will take under its control practically all forces still remaining under the Main Command's control.

After the Minsk summit, CIS Marshal Shaposhnikov publicly expressed his displeasure at speculations on the forthcoming creation of the Russian federation Department of Defense. "The position of the President is that he doesn't intend to rush the formation of Russia's own Ministry and its Armed Forces," he said at the press conference on February 18. He mentioned that, in Minsk, only two out of eight republics signed the Agreement on the Unified General Purpose Forces—Belarus and Uzbekistan. "All others, including Russia, have their own Committees for Defense Affairs. I think there is no need to hurry with this question,"³²⁶ suggested Marshal Shaposhnikov.

Nevertheless, on March 16, 1992, President Boris Yeltsin finally agreed to establish the Defense Ministry of Russia. The Ministry of Defense was ordered to prepare proposals concerning the Armed Forces of Russia. At the same time, it was announced that the Armed Forces of Russia were transferred to the Unified General Purpose Forces under the

operational control of the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces.³²⁷ This was done to prevent possible competition between Commonwealth and Russian military authorities.

The presidential order did not define which troops are included in the Armed Forces of Russia. Presumably, they include not only former Soviet forces on Russian territory, but also forces outside the Commonwealth (Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states). In fact, President Yeltsin announced at the Officers' Assembly in January that these troops be placed under the jurisdiction of Russia. The Russian President also appointed an official delegation to negotiate the status of troops located on the territory of other CIS states, which are not included in the Strategic Forces or national armies of the former Soviet republics. This will add another 400,000 soldiers to Russia's jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, Belarus will follow Ukraine (550,000 soldiers) in nationalizing the Soviet forces on its territory (220,000). The fate of the military in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and the Trans-Caucasian states (660,000) is not clear. As it is a predominantly Russian force, however, the troops are unlikely to switch their loyalty to these republics. If Russia claims these troops, it may come into conflict with the states on whose territories they are deployed. In these states, the Russian Army will be seen as a foreign occupying force and many countries will demand their withdrawal back to Russia (leaving their weapons in place).

President Yeltsin, without negotiating with the other republics, claimed the Trans-Caucasian military district and the Caspian Fleet for Russia.³²⁸ He will likely do the same with the former Soviet troops in Central Asia.

If the Allied Military Forces are not created and Russia assumes control over the bulk of the Soviet Army, it will have to redeploy more than one million soldiers and large numbers of weapons to Russian territory. It will also have to demobilize most of them. Because hundreds of thousands of officers and warrant-officers lack housing and work in the civilian sphere, such huge reductions, on top of what has been planned previously, might produce serious political consequences. Russia will have to house and retrain former military officers. Even more expensive will be the unavoidable conversion of defense industries due to drastic reductions in military hardware procurement.

Some financial support may come from Germany. According to official Russian sources, the German government will spend 15 billion marks on the Western Group of Forces. Seven billion marks (4 billion marks in grants and 3 billion in credit) are earmarked for the maintenance and withdrawal of troops. Two hundred million marks have been allocated for retraining military personnel for civilian professions. And finally, 7.8 billion will be spent on housing. The original plan called for construction of 17 military townships in Ukraine, 8 in Belarus, and 7 in Russia. Later, Russia suggested that 15 townships should be built in Russia, 7 in Belarus, and only 2 in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, however, objected to these changes. Therefore, the German government decided to freeze the funds for housing until this controversy is settled.³²⁹

So while remaining a formidable power, Russia will be too busy to think about its military legacy. These reductions can be successfully managed during a transition period, preferably through a joint program with other members of the Commonwealth. The reductions also have to correspond to the requirements of the CFE Treaty. The former

Soviet quota, therefore, should be divided between Russia and the other former Europe Soviet Republics. The reductions should be administered under international control without jeopardizing the ratification and implementation of this Treaty.

The major security task during this period will be keeping the former Soviet military under civilian political control, while simultaneously cutting and transforming the military forces into a number of allied armies.

The newspaper *Moskovskiy Komsomolets* explained that "Yeltsin broke his promise that Russia would be the last of all former republics to build its Army" because all efforts to build the CIS army failed: "The idea of a Unified Armed Forces has been defeated. This is proved by the lack of any results from the many efforts by heads of state to agree. Ukraine rushes to create its own army. It's dangerous for Russia to lag behind."³³⁰

Moskovskiy Komsomolets speculated about the reasons why President Yeltsin decided to take the position of Defense Minister of Russia: "Probably he's done it not because he wants to concentrate power in his own hands. His motives are similar to his decision to take the position of Head of the Cabinet of Ministers. There are many candidates who fit the requirements for this position, but none has enough prestige to stand against the devastating criticism of his opponents after his appointment."³³¹

This decision was acceptable to the Main Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces. On March 27, Marshal Shaposhnikov discussed issues of implementing the decision to create a Defense Ministry and Armed Forces of Russia. Colonel General Pavel Grachev, former Chairman of the Russian State Committee on Defense, who was appointed First Deputy Defense Minister by President Boris Yeltsin, presented his report. According to Grachev, the Russian Armed Forces would consist of the Ground Forces, the Navy, the Air Force, and other forces. The Air Defense forces may be split among the other services. Manpower will be substantially reduced to 1.2 to 1.3 million people.³³²

On March 5, 1992, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet adopted a law "On Security," which provided the ground rules for security for the individual citizen, society, and the state. According to this law, the security of the Russian Federation is ensured by the Armed Forces, federal security agencies, external intelligence, internal affairs agencies, tax services, border and internal troops, civil defense units, an emergency situation agency, customs and environmental protection offices under the general guidance of the President, and control by the Russian Supreme Soviet.

Parliamentary debates concentrated on the composition of the newly established Security Council. It was decided that the Security Council would consist of the President, Vice President, first deputy speaker of the Supreme Soviet, the Vice Premier, and Secretary. On April 3, 1992, President Yeltsin signed a decree appointing Yury Skokov secretary of the Russian Federation's Security Council. A former official of the military industry (director of the "Quant" research and production enterprise), Mr. Skokov was the first Deputy Prime Minister from 1990 to 1991. He then served as a State Adviser and Secretary of the Presidential Commission established to develop proposals on the creation of the Security Council.³³³

The growing influence of the military industry was also reflected in the law "On Conversion of the Defense Industry of the Russian Federation," adopted by the Supreme

Soviet on March 20, 1992. According to this law, the Defense Ministry is to conduct all planning for defense industry procurement and conversion. A special Federal Foundation for Conversion has been created, which is supposed to provide credits for conversion. The law states that enterprises must be informed about Defense Ministry orders at least two years before the beginning of development or production of armaments and other military equipment. If the orders are changed or cancelled, the Government will compensate for the loss through allocations from the federal budget.

There will also be regional programs for defense industry conversion. Towns where 20 percent or more of the employed population can lose their jobs because of conversion are given special "priority status." At a meeting with representatives of the military industry, on May 13, Yeltsin discussed ways to privatize and reconstruct this industry. He proposed to organize two huge state-owned companies that would be responsible for these tasks and also for scientific and technological policies. The President mentioned the possible growth of the defense budget in 1993 because "the present level of expenditures is defined by a lack of resources, not by the needs of the Russian Army."³³⁴

On April 6, President Yeltsin appointed Colonel General Dmitriy Volkogonov Chairman of the State Commission for the Creation of the Armed Forces of Russia. In an interview, General Volkogonov said that Russia would control about 2.5 million troops, which would be reduced to 1.5 million in two years.³³⁵

According to Colonel General Leontiy Kuznetsov, deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff, "compared to other republics that became independent, Russia finds itself in the most disadvantageous position," because "this huge republic has now inherited only the remnants of what used to be the most powerful concentration of forces on the Eurasian continent."³³⁶ According to his estimates, ready forces in Russia include only the 2nd "Taman" Motorized Rifle Division, the 4th "Kantemirov" Tank Division, the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the Airborne Divisions. "Russia made huge investments in the sphere of defense and now has practically nothing on the European territory," stated General Kuznetsov. "And there is barely a minimum of what we should have behind the Urals."³³⁷

In an interview with *Nezavisimaya Gazetta* on the eve of President Yeltsin's order to establish Russia's Armed Forces, General Kuznetsov said:

We used to aim for the English Channel. That's why all of the best personnel--officers, warrant-officers, contract soldiers--were sent West, to the first echelon: the Western, the Central, the Northern, and the Southern groups of forces, the Belarusian, the Baltic, and the Ukrainian military districts. If you compare the three Ukrainian military districts (now the Armed Forces of Ukraine) and our three military districts (the Moscow, the Northern Caucuses, and the Volga-Urals districts), the ratio is 3 to 1 in favor of Ukraine. This is true about the equipment and armaments and especially about the ready divisions of Ground Forces. At the same time, our forces far in the West--the Western and the Central group of forces, the forces in the Baltic

states, and the Belarusian military district—all of them are being withdrawn and cannot be counted as battle ready.³³⁸

At the hearings on the Defense Act held by the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security in May, Lieutenant General Victor Barynkyn, who represented the General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, admitted that there were several versions of the concept of a Russian Army. He pleaded, however, that the Committee accept the proposals of the General Staff, which corresponded "to the principles of defense sufficiency and economic necessity."³³⁹

Colonel General Leontiy Kuznetsov, deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head of the General Staff Main Operations Directorate, strongly objected to the more radical proposals for military reform, claiming:

There is no alternative to the existing General Staff.... I'm sure that President Yeltsin will use it as the basis for the Russian General Staff. This has also been suggested by the State Commission. Of course, the leadership of the Defense Ministry will check people and conduct reductions. But it has to change people very carefully.... If there is a civilian minister, if there are new people under him, defense readiness will suffer tremendously.³⁴⁰

The General Staff of the Unified Armed Forces wants to become the Russian General Staff. It plans to reduce the Russian Armed Forces by 700,000 in 1992, and finish redeploying forces from Germany and Poland in 1993 and 1994. Later, it plans to reorganize the remaining forces.³⁴¹

On May 1, 1992, the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of Russia numbered 2.8 million.³⁴² According to General Kuznetsov, the General Staff is preparing plans on the basis of President Yeltsin's announcement that the Russian Armed Forces will consist of 1.5 million and later, 1.2 million troops. Said Kuznetsov: "We concluded that in order to avoid a landslide reduction, we have to bring the Army to the level of 2 million by the year 1995. Only by the year 2000 can we reach the level of 1.5 million. If it's done any earlier, the landslide reductions will cost three to five times more."³⁴³

At the parliamentary hearings, General Barynkyn claimed that the cost of the military transition will exceed 1.5 trillion rubles. This includes 100 million rubles for housing for retired military officers; 342 billion for the redeployment of forces from Europe, the Caucuses, and Central Asia; and 100 billion rubles for the destruction of old nuclear-powered submarines.³⁴⁴ Annual expenditures on the current officer force are 90 billion rubles. If 300,000 officers retire within the next year or two, according to General Kuznetsov, this will require more than 300 billion rubles in compensation payments.³⁴⁵

When describing the future Armed Forces of Russia, Colonel General Leontiy Kuznetsov, deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head of the General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, has said: "It's necessary to correct the situation with the units deployed on the territory of Russia. Let's have a small number of units, but at full

strength, highly mobile, professional, and instantly ready. This is the General Staff's ideal."³⁴⁶

The General Staff wants to keep all five services—the Strategic Missile Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Ground Forces, and the Air Defense—in the Russian Armed Forces until at least the year 2000.³⁴⁷ According to General Barynkyn, the greatest reductions will occur in the Ground Forces, which are to be cut three to five times.³⁴⁸

General Pavel Grachev, who was later appointed Defense Minister of Russia, stressed that a huge Ground Forces with an enormous number of tanks does not correspond to the experience of the recent decades. That's why fast deployment forces will play an important role in the Russian Armed Forces. These forces will include airborne troops and marines, capable of acting autonomously in any area with the help of contemporary military transportation aviation, helicopters, and land assault ships.

The military districts and front commands will be disbanded. The Army will be reorganized and instead of divisions and armies, it will consist of brigades and corps. It has been suggested that two theater commands —West (in the European part of Russia) and East (from the Urals to the Kamchatka peninsula) should be created.³⁴⁹

The Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Victor Samsonov, has changed his previous estimates:

With the withdrawal of troops from Eastern European countries, we face a situation where the first echelon has disappeared. This would have delivered substantial harm to a single state like the Soviet Union. But we cannot see the situation from this point of view. The Commonwealth has been created, and the geopolitical situation has changed. We don't see the West as our enemy anymore. That is why there is no need to restore the first strategic echelon as it existed before with the same tasks.³⁵⁰

General Samsonov said that the new "concept of mobile defense provides for the creation of structures that would be tuned toward the prevention of local conflicts."³⁵¹

Colonel General Victor Miruk, a member of the State Commission on the Creation of the Defense Ministry of Russia, argued that "the modern military doctrine does not see any specific state or a coalition of states as an enemy."³⁵² He expressed the need to differentiate between "a potential risk [concern, anxiety, danger]" and "a potential threat."³⁵³ In Miruk's view, the Armed Forces in peacetime must correspond to potential risks, which should first be responded to by all political, diplomatic, and economic means. General Miruk spoke of the following risks:

- There are still some states with peacetime concentrations of Armed Forces and high mobilization potential.

- There are territorial disputes between states, which when combined with national/ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts, can cause wars and regional conflicts.
- Some states continue to strive for hegemony at the global or regional level.
- The foreign policy of some states can be influenced by changes in leadership, and by domestic, political, and economic crises.³⁵⁴

General Miruk defined a threat as "the possibility of aggression" and suggested that the Armed Forces is a last resort for defense of state sovereignty and would be used only when all other means had failed. In his words, "the concept of potential risks determines a rational military posture, while the concept of potential threat speaks of the mobilization capabilities of the country." According to Miruk, the potential risks demand that the Armed Forces consume no more than 0.4 to 0.8 percent of the national population. On the other hand, the threat [mobilization readiness] requires that 10 to 15 percent of the population serve in the military.³⁵⁵

On May 7, 1992, President Yeltsin signed a decree on "Creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." This paper mentioned the continuity of the "heroic traditions of the Russian Army" (but not the Soviet Army), pledged "to implement any obligations under existing treaties and agreements on arms reductions and disarmament," and requested that the members conclude a Collective Security Treaty.³⁵⁶

Yeltsin enumerated the principles upon which the Russian Armed Forces would be built:

The military structures will be controlled by the highest government institutions. The organizational structure, composition, and amount of forces will correspond to the concept of security in Russia. Forces will be international in composition and based on cadres, but manned through a combination of conscription and volunteer service; permanent readiness [will be maintained]; and [there will be a] reliance on national and historical traditions, and international standards of military policy.³⁵⁷

The decree declared that the Russian Armed Forces will include all units, headquarters, and military facilities in Russia and troops outside of the Russian Federation, but under the jurisdiction of Russia.³⁵⁸ Yeltsin also announced that the Strategic Forces on Russian territory would remain integrated into the Unified Armed Forces, which is under the control of the Main Command of the Unified Armed Forces.

President Yeltsin ordered the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry to reach an agreement, through interstate negotiations, on the status of Russian forces outside of Russia and on status of the CIS Strategic Forces. Until the necessary legislature is adopted by the Russian Parliament, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are to be under the command of the First Deputy Defense Minister (General Pavel Brachev).³⁵⁹ However, to avoid loss of command and control over the troops before the military command of the

Russian Federation is formed, these functions are entrusted to the structures of "the former Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the USSR."³⁶⁰

President Yeltsin also authorized the Russian Defense Ministry to prepare proposals on "the essence of military reform; the reduction of manpower in the Armed Forces and the Navy; reductions in manpower and expenditures related to the stage by stage transition to a professional Armed Forces; measures for social protection of officers and retired military personnel; the reliable defense of strategic facilities in Russia; and a reorganization of the procurement system."³⁶¹

In a separate order, President Yeltsin authorized General Pavel Grachev to have temporary direct control and command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. General Grachev was also asked to prepare proposals on the development of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, and on the concept of a Russian Army and its financing. The President ordered General Grachev to obtain a rapport with the Commander-in-Chief of CIS Unified Armed Forces on the division of functions between the Defense Ministry of Russia and the CIS Main Command, and to ensure interaction with military authorities of other Commonwealth members.³⁶² This order ignored the role of civilian First Deputy Defense Minister, Professor Andrey Kokoshin. It also demonstrated that Yeltsin has decided against creating a civilian Defense Ministry.

The Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, Aviation Marshal Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, denied that he wanted to become Defense Minister of Russia. In an interview with *Izvestiya*, Marshal Shaposhnikov said: "In my view, the President of Russia should keep the position of Defense Minister, while I keep the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces."³⁶³

On May 18, President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree, appointing Army General Pavel Grachev to the post of Defense Minister of Russia. In his first interview, the new minister said: "First of all, the period of uncertainty is over. There will be a Russian Army formed on the basis of the former Soviet Armed Forces. Secondly, the reductions will be landslide but protracted until the end of this century."³⁶⁴ According to General Grachev:

The Defense Ministry will present to the Government and the Supreme Soviet of Russia a military doctrine concept that will provide for a defensive, but mobile posture. Because Russia has lost its best units and most modern equipment (they were nationalized by Ukraine and Belarus), the Defense Ministry and the military industrial complex of Russia were given the task of equipping the Russian Army with qualitatively new weapons, preferably smart ones.³⁶⁵

General Grachev revealed that all appointments will be made "on a competitive basis" by a special committee within the Security Council. He also announced that the draft would continue. Russian conscripts would serve in the Trans-Caucuses region only "after their written agreements," but wouldn't serve in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (he failed to mention whether conscripts from other republics would serve in Russia).³⁶⁶

According to estimates of the Russian Defense Ministry, in 1992, it will be able to draft 252,000 conscripts.³⁶⁷ The number of conscripts in Russia is falling. In 1989, 47 percent of draftees were exempted from conscription; in 1991—more than 70 percent. In 1989, there were 3,000 draft dodgers; in 1991—17,000. Only 28 percent of the young men are expected to be drafted into the Army in 1992.³⁶⁸

The planned 1992 defense budget for the CIS Unified Armed Forces, which was almost completely supported by Russia alone, was 384 billion rubles in current prices (including 50 billion rubles for the first quarter and 118 billion rubles for the second quarter). Only 80 billion rubles will be spent on procurement of armaments and military equipment (37.8 percent of the 1991 level) and only 6.5 billion were allocated for procurement in the first quarter of 1992 (17 percent of the level of the first quarter of 1991). But, in the first quarter, the Unified Armed Forces had already spent 40 billion rubles more than was appropriated by the Russian Supreme Soviet. According to estimates, the second quarter will exceed the ceiling by another 70 billion rubles.

An additional 95 billion rubles will be spent on defense industry conversion, including 12 billion rubles in the first quarter and 37.5 billion in the second. According to the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on Industry and Energy, the defense industries consist of 6,000 to 7,000 enterprises, 1,200 of which produce only military equipment. Nine hundred of these enterprises are to be completely converted to civilian production (500 are currently in the process of conversion).

At a news conference on May 7, the State Adviser on Questions of Conversion, Mikhail Maley, announced that the process of defense industry conversion will take 15 years and require \$150 billion. According to Maley, sales of arms produced in 1991 brought in \$14 billion.

The speaker of the Russian Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov disclosed: "The Supreme Soviet of Russia has prepared a package of laws on military issues. With their adoption, the Russian Army will get a solid legal foundation, without which it cannot perform its functions."³⁶⁹

The process of forming the Armed Forces of Russia is not going to be easy. Yelstin's decision is of crucial importance to all forthcoming arrangements concerning the division of the Soviet military by the former republics of the USSR and the creation of a common defense system for the Commonwealth.

SOME ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

It seems that the most acceptable and suitable military and political union for Russia is the establishment of an alliance similar to NATO, which would include all members of the CIS and embrace all CIS territories as one common strategic and defensive area.

The prospects for forming a common military and political union do not look very promising at this time because of the contradictions and disagreements among the former Soviet republics on issues such as the level and direction of the external military threat, the build up of military forces, and the resolution of military strategy and doctrine. Such a union can be organized only if the security interests of its members have a stable and durable character. Unfortunately, this is not the case with the CIS because of internal instability in many sovereign states and discrepancies among their long-term national security interests. It is natural that the former Soviet republics will face different geostrategic and geopolitical situations and have different ideas of national security. Thus, one cannot fully exclude the possibility of a Russian dilemma between military and political isolation and a search for new forms of cooperation with other republics.

For Russia, the politics of isolation contain such dangers as the creation of a hostile political and military environment, the emergence of contradictions from the Soviet military and political legacy, the proliferation of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of new military unions and alliances "behind Russia's back." Russia might also see discrimination against Russians living in some former Union republics, as well as the erection of obstacles to Russian integration into the world political and economic infrastructure.

A system of multi- and bilateral alliances between Russia and the newly independent states might prevent Russia's political and military isolation and maintain a certain level of cooperation with the former Soviet republics. The necessary conditions for establishing any of these alliances must be the equality of all member states, mutual interests, and the will to cooperate militarily and politically.

Some of these alliances will be temporary, since they will be aimed at solving concrete security issues in the transitional period. This does not exclude the possibility of forming stable and durable unions in addition to establishing new alliances to deal with future problems.

Most of the newly independent countries are likely to be interested in preserving friendly alliances with Russia. Every state, however, will be ruled by its own security and defense interests. The uncontrolled disintegration of the former Soviet Armed Forces and the transformation of the Army into an independent political power could lead to a repetition of events in Yugoslavia. This type of conflict would have much more dramatic and tragic consequences because some military units are equipped with nuclear and chemical weapons. Russia's emergence as a militarily strong, unaligned state does not correspond to the security interests of the new sovereign republics.

Some of the CIS members (Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics) are interested in cooperating with Russia, especially in the areas of building a national military force, teaching and training military personnel, purchasing armament, maintaining and

repairing military equipment, and so forth. For the leaders of some former Soviet republics, the question of cooperation with Russia equates to their political survival. After all, a radical change in military and foreign policy priorities would certainly mean transferring power to political groups with more clearly expressed nationalistic and fundamentalist feelings.

New relations among the former Soviet republics can be based on different organizational and functional principles. The idea of establishing a system of military and political alliances surely deserves a deeper and more thorough examination. This analysis should take into account the regional, national, and ethnic peculiarities of each possible alliance.

Following are tentative variants of the unions and alliances that could be developed:

- A nuclear alliance of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan for considering problems of nonproliferation, the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms, and the creation of nuclear-free zones.
- Bilateral mutual security and cooperation treaties; members of these treaties could be any former Soviet republic, particularly those that are not the members of any multilateral agreements.
- A multilateral treaty on collective defense, mutual security, and cooperation involving Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tadzhikistan. This idea was partially implemented when the Agreement on Collective Security was signed on May 15, 1992, at the CIS summit in Tashkent. This document was signed by six Commonwealth members (Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, and Armenia) and commits these states not only to military cooperation, but to some basic principles of mutual assistance in the case of aggression against one or more of the signatories. The number of agreement participants is not limited to the states who have signed the agreement. Not one republic can exclude other states that wish to join (such as Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and so forth).
- A treaty on the status of Armed Forces stationed on foreign (other republic) territories involving Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, Armenia, Moldova(?), and Belarus(?). This alliance would address institutional and legal questions, financial and social security problems, and so forth.
- A treaty on assistance for building up national (republican) Armed Forces involving Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, Armenia, and Moldova(?).
- A collective security treaty for the Black sea region among Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova(?), Turkey(?), Bulgaria(?), and Rumania(?).

- A collective security and confidence-building measures treaty for the Baltic sea region involving Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Poland, and Germany(?).
- An East European Union, made up of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, to coordinate military policy and conventional arms control policy, to hold political consultations, and so forth.
- A Central Asian Union involving Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan and possibly even China, to coordinate military policy, territorial defense problems, arms trade, and so forth.

For each of the proposed treaties a wide range of cooperation and coordination options must be determined on the basis of mutual agreement and interest. These options might include the coordination of military activities and defense policies and strategies, coordination of military reform and Armed Forces construction programs, mutual defense of the borders, coordination of military conversion projects, information exchange, and coordination of arms reduction proposals.

Russia's relationship with the United States is also of paramount importance. Additional reductions may result from new Russian-American arms control agreements, especially in strategic armaments. Russia's interest in the complete denuclearization of the other former Soviet republics could push it to agree to a U.S. proposal to ban MIRVed ICBMs. Yet, Russia can agree only if the United States compensates by limiting deployment of the new D-5 SLBMs on Trident submarines, which would remove the possibility of preemptive strikes between the two nations. Such a deal can be made early enough to push both sides to 2,500 to 3,000 strategic warheads (compared to 11,000 to 12,000 now).

An agreement of this kind will allow both countries to bury the legacy of the Cold War and to move to a new type of strategic relationship, that is, from confrontation to a cooperative partnership. While the two sides will retain their ability to destroy each other in 30 minutes, they will have no reasons to be in conflict.

Russia will not be an economic competitor of the United States, and the geopolitical interests of the two nations do not conflict. They may even share some important interests in the prevention of nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation and the opposition of Islamic fundamentalism. Because Russia will remain a formidable military power in the heartland of Eurasia, it is an important factor in American efforts to manage the multipolar balance of power, especially now that the U.S. is cutting defense in favor of domestic priorities.

Such cooperation should, however, be accompanied by coordinated reductions in the war-making machines of both the U.S. and Russia. Managing the common nuclear legacy will include joint efforts in several areas:

- Reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenal to lower levels and a more stable configuration, which would allow the U.S. and Russia to reduce launch-on-warning postures

- The ability to ensure the safety of the nuclear infrastructure and eliminate excessive nuclear warheads
- Social rehabilitation of the military
- Conversion of defense industries.

This agenda demands that a strategic dialogue begin early to explore possibilities of changes in the U.S.-Russia military relationship from regulated competition to a more cooperative model.

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